Voting Advice Applications and Electoral Participation: A Multi-Method Study

Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) help users casting a vote by offering an explicit ranking of viable options. The wide amount of readily available information provided by VAAs to users has been shown to contribute to reducing the transactional costs involved in gathering relevant political information. Available evidence also supports the idea that VAA users are more likely to cast a ballot in elections as a result. The extent to which electoral participation is caused by using a VAA, however, remains unclear. Against this background, we reassess the mobilizing effect of VAAs by means of a multi-method approach. Our cross-sectional analysis of 12 national election study data sets provides further support to the idea that VAA usage increases users’ chances of casting a ballot in elections as compared to non-users. This conclusion is strengthened by the results of a randomized field experiment conducted in the context of the 2013 Italian parliamentary election.     

When Basic Income Meets Professor Pangloss: Ignoring Public Administration and Its Perils

Basic income advocates propose a model that they believe will dramatically improve on current welfare programmes by alleviating poverty, reducing involuntary unemployment and social exclusion, redistributing care work, achieving a better work–life balance, and so on. Whether these expected social effects materialise in practice critically depends on how the model is implemented, but on this topic the basic income debate remains largely silent. Few advocates explicitly consider questions of implementation, and those that do are typically dismissive of the administrative challenges of implementing a basic income and critical (even overtly hostile) towards bureaucracy. In this contribution we briefly examine (and rebut) several reasons that have led basic income advocates to ignore administration. The main peril of such neglect, we argue, is that it misleads basic income advocates into a form of Panglossian optimism that risks causing basic income advocacy to become self‐defeating.     

Two principles of equal language recognition

Within the umbrella of equal recognition, several principles of linguistic justice can be distinguished. A first, the per-capita principle, mandates prorating language recognition based on a per-capita distribution. A second, the equal-services principle, prescribes upholding the official languages as the languages in which the state speaks and in which public services are provided, irrespective of changing numbers of speakers. Alan Patten defends the prorated per-capita principle. I argue for the equal-services principle, which practically will often amount to a form of linguistic maximin: the more vulnerable the language, the more numerous the resources.     

Women United for the United Nations: US women advocating for collective security in the cold war

This article details the creation of Women United for the United Nations (WUUN), a coalition of US women's non-governmental organizations created in the wake of the Second World War to advocate for the United Nations and the efficacy of collective security. The article illuminates the strategies the organization used to flourish in the 1950s, an era characterized by suspicion of political activism and conformity for US women. It describes WUUN's initiatives and documents the way the organization clashed with a more radical women's peace group, WOMAN. The article places the discussion of WUUN in the context of work done by other historians on the fate of other US women's organizations in the 1950s and provides a detailed account of the measures WUUN took to navigate the complexities that confronted women activists in the Cold War.     

Did Covid-19 Change Armed Group Governance? Evidence from a Survey of Local Security Authorities in Colombia

As the Covid-19 pandemic began, initial reports suggested that armed groups would seize the opportunity to expand their control over territory and civilians. However, drawing on an original survey of local security officials responsible for monitoring armed group behaviour in Colombia, we find little evidence of significant shifts in the presence or behaviour of political or criminal groups. Contrary to prevailing expectations, we also find that armed group governance is common in areas contested by multiple groups. Our findings shed new light on armed group adaptation to shocks, and challenge the assumption that territorial control is a prerequisite for governance.