Signaling and Counter‐Signaling in the Judicial Hierarchy: An Empirical Analysis of En Banc Review

We leverage the institutional features of American courts to evaluate the importance of whistleblowers in hierarchical oversight. Drawing on a formal theory of signaling in the judicial hierarchy, we examine the role of whistleblowing dissents in triggering en banc review of three‐judge panels by full circuits of the Courts of Appeals. The theory generates predictions about how dissent interacts with judicial preferences to influence circuits' review and reversal decisions, which we test using original and existing data. First, we show that judges who dissent counter to their preferences are more likely to see their dissents lead to review and reversal. Second, we show that dissents are most influential when the likelihood of non‐compliance by a three‐judge panel is highest. Our results underscore the importance of dissent in the judicial hierarchy and illustrate how judicial whistleblowers can help appellate courts target the most important cases for review.     

Longitudinal Associations between Social Relationships and Alcohol Use from Adolescence into Young Adulthood: The Role of Religiousness

Journal of Youth and Adolescence - As adolescence is a time characterized by rapid changes in social relationships as well as an increase in risk-taking behaviors, this prospective longitudinal...     

Whistleblowing and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy

One way that principals can overcome the problem of informational asymmetries in hierarchical organizations is to enable whistleblowing. We evaluate how whistleblowing influences compliance in the judicial hierarchy. We present a formal model in which a potential whistleblower may, at some cost, signal noncompliance by a lower court to a higher court. A key insight of the model is that whistleblowing is most informative when it is rare. While the presence of a whistleblower can increase compliance by lower courts, beyond a certain point blowing the whistle is counterproductive and actually reduces compliance. Moreover, a whistleblower who is a “perfect ally” of the higher court (in terms of preferences) blows the whistle too often. Our model shows an important connection between the frequency of whistleblowing and the effectiveness of whistleblowing as a threat to induce compliance in hierarchical organizations.     

Personal and Vicarious Experience with the Criminal Justice System as a Predictor of Punitive Sentencing Attitudes

This study examined the impact of prior personal or vicarious experience with the criminal justice system on sentencing attitudes. Existing research on sentencing attitudes has examined factors such as race, gender, income level, political affiliation, and education level, but few research studies have focused on actual contact with the criminal justice system and its influence on perceptions of sentencing as either too harsh or too lenient. The current study utilized data collected by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. Over 1,500 respondents were surveyed nationwide in 2006 regarding sentencing attitudes. Logistic regression analysis was utilized to assess the impact of factors of interest on sentencing attitudes. Results indicated that individuals who had been charged with a crime (personal experience), or who had an immediate relative or close friend who had been charged (vicarious experience), were more likely to perceive the criminal justice system as too harsh, regardless of race/ethnicity.     

Is international agricultural research a global public good? The case of rice biofortification

The status of international agricultural research as a global public good (GPG) has been widely accepted since the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. While the term was not used at the time of its creation, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) system that evolved at that time has been described as a 'prime example of the promise, performance and perils of an international approach to providing GPGs'. Contemporary literature on international agricultural research as a GPG tends to support this view and focuses on how to operationalize the concept. This paper adopts a different starting point and questions this conceptualization of the CGIAR and its outputs. It questions the appropriateness of such a 'neutral' concept to a system born of the imperatives of Cold War geopolitics, and shaped by a history of attempts to secure its relevance in a changing world. This paper draws on a multi-sited, ethnographic study of a research effort highlighted by the CGIAR as an exemplar of GPG-oriented research. Behind the ubiquitous language of GPGs, 'partnership' and 'consensus', however, new forms of exclusion and restriction are emerging within everyday practice, reproducing North-South inequalities and undermining the ability of these programmes to respond to the needs of projected beneficiaries.     

Observations of reintegrative shaming in a mental health court

This study compares the use of stigmatizing and reintegrative shame - as specified in Braithwaite's Crime, shame and reintegration (1989) - across traditional criminal court and mental health court settings. Items from the Global Observational Ratings Instrument were used to gather data on 87 traditional court cases and 91 mental health court cases, presided over by five different judges. The observational items capture three constructs: respect, disapproval, and forgiveness, as they apply to Braithwaite's theory. We present means tests to examine differences in shaming between court types and judges. Findings show that the mental health court is more likely to use reintegrative shaming and show respect and forgiveness for offenders, and less likely to show disapproval. Similarly, judges who preside in both court types are significantly more likely to practice reintegrative shaming in the mental health court context. We further explore these findings using field notes and illustrate those components of a mental health court that are conducive to reintegrative shaming.