SSI: trends and changes, 1974-80

By the end of 1980, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program was making monthly cash assistance payments, averaging $170, to almost 4.2 million aged, blind, and disabled persons. When SSI payments began in January 1974, the number of recipients was 3.2 million and the average payment was $117. Since 1975, both SSI payments and Social Security benefits have been automatically adjusted each year to correspond with increases in the Consumer Price Index. A number of other trends in addition to growth can be discerned in the size of the population served, as well as in their categorical, geographic, and age distributions. This article discusses some of these trends and changes, using program data for the end of each calendar year through 1980. It also presents a brief summary of the program at the end of that period.     

The politics of the national assessment of chapter 1

This article describes the events associated with the National Assessment of Chapter 1, a study mandated by Congress in December 1983 in anticipation of its 1987 reauthorization of Chapter 1. The assessment occurred at the time the Reagan Administration was seriously challenging many of Congress's favorite educational programs, including Chapter 1. Despite their serious differences in views about Chapter 1, both Congress and the administration expected the assessment to serve their own needs and each group was worried that the other would have undue influence on the assessment. The article illustrates the politics associated with evaluation by describing the activities of the assessment, the responses of each of these two audiences, and the efforts of each side to control the assessment's agenda. It raises questions about whether an evaluation can really serve multiple audiences.     

Michelin II: A Per Se Rule Against Rebates by Dominant Companies?

In its Michelin II judgment of September 2003, the CFI foundthat Michelin breached Article 82 EC by setting up a systemof rebates that could potentially induce loyalty and excludeits competitors. This paper comments extensively on MichelinII and other cases, with a focus on what sort of competitionpolicy is desirable as regards rebates by dominant companies.Contrary to Michelin II, pricing policies of dominant companieswhich are not linear and not strictly reflecting economies ofscale are not necessarily anticompetitive and may indeed havesignificant pro-competitive effects. Furthermore, a requirementthat a rebate scheme be "economically justified" is very difficultto apply in practice, and the Court should not have put theburden of proof for the justification of quantitative rebatesupon the dominant company. Most preoccupying is the Court'srejection of the effect criterion when deciding on the legalityof a rebate: Such an approach, which differs markedly from USand UK law as well as from the OECD report on fidelity discounts,will generally result in a disproportionate per se-prohibitionof any pricing behaviour and in economic inefficiencies. A fairerand clearer approach could therefore distinguish between rebatesthat are per se allowed and other rebates that ought to be prohibitedonly if they have effects on the market.     

Asia-Pacific news

This column provides a country by country analysis of the latest legal developments, cases and issues relevant to the IT, media and telecommunications' industries in key jurisdictions across the Asia Pacific region. The articles appearing in this column are intended to serve as ‘alerts’ and are not submitted as detailed analyses of cases or legal developments.     

Analyzing the Influence of Micro-Level Factors on CCTV Camera Effect

Objectives

Despite the popularity of closed circuit television (CCTV), evidence of its crime prevention capabilities is inconclusive. Research has largely reported CCTV effect as “mixed” without explaining this variance. The current study contributes to the literature by testing the influence of several micro-level factors on changes in crime levels within CCTV areas of Newark, NJ.

Methods

Viewsheds, denoting the line-of-sight of CCTV cameras, were units of analysis (N = 117). Location quotients, controlling for viewshed size and control-area crime incidence, measured changes in the levels of six crime categories, from the pre-installation period to the post-installation period. Ordinary least squares regression models tested the influence of specific micro-level factors—environmental features, camera line-of-sight, enforcement activity, and camera design—on each crime category.

Results

First, the influence of environmental features differed across crime categories, with specific environs being related to the reduction of certain crimes and the increase of others. Second, CCTV-generated enforcement was related to the reduction of overall crime, violent crime and theft-from-auto. Third, obstructions to CCTV line-of-sight caused by immovable objects were related to increased levels of auto theft and decreased levels of violent crime, theft from auto and robbery.

Conclusions

The findings suggest that CCTV operations should be designed in a manner that heightens their deterrent effect. Specifically, police should account for the presence of crime generators/attractors and ground-level obstructions when selecting camera sites, and design the operational strategy in a manner that generates maximum levels of enforcement.