A unique case of congenital bilateral absence of parietal bones in a neonate

The remains of an unidentified female neonate were discovered in a field in central Missouri. Examination revealed bilateral absence of the parietal bones. A search of the literature describing similar defects suggests that the present case represents a unique condition, described here for the first time.     

Isolation of the DNA minisatellite probe MZ 1.3 and its application to DNA 'fingerprinting' analysis

A minisatellite probe, MZ 1.3, detecting hypervariable fragment patterns was isolated from a human genomic library. A repetitive sequence of 27 bp length was identified which is contained in the probe approx. 40 times. The MZ 1.3 repeat shows variable homology of 53-73% to the repetitive sequence of the protein III gene of the bacteriophage M13 genome. Polymorphic restriction fragment patterns were found with MZ 1.3 using the enzymes Hinf I, BstN I, Hae III, Mbo I, PstI/Pvu II, and Rsa I. An average of 18 polymorphic fragments was observed using Hinf I as enzyme. The band sharing frequency after Hinf I digestion among unrelated individuals was determined to be 23.8 +/- 7.2%. An example for the application of MZ 1.3 to paternity testing in an incest case is given. The probe can be used with radioactive or non-radioactive detection systems. An approach is presented to compare polymorphic fragment patterns from individuals obtained by independent gel runs on the basis of relative band positions (RBP) and calculated in a computerized analysis.     

Thirty Years of Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases*

The Supreme Court early took note of extralegal, “social science” materials in Muller v. Oregon (1908), and a half-century later made specific reference to social science authorities in the famous footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Since Brown, much has been written about the Supreme Court's use of social science research evidence, but there has been little systematic study of that use. Those writing on the subject commonly focus on areas of law such as jury size, where social science has been used, and have generally assumed that social science information has been utilized in Supreme Court decisions with increasing regularity. Surprisingly little is known, however, about either the justices' baseline use of social science authorities, or many other aspects of their uses of social science information. The focus here is on the citation of social science research evidence in a sample of 240 criminal cases decided during the 30 years between the Supreme Court's 1958 and 1987 Terms. The resulting portrait contributes to a fuller understanding of the justices' use of social science materials, and may ultimately help promote more effective utilization of social science research evidence in Supreme Court decisions.     

CRIME IN EMERGING ADULTHOOD*

The extent to which local life circumstances influence criminal activity has been the focus of much theoretical debate. Although empirical research has been initiated, it remains limited. Herein, we use data on 524 serious offenders from the California Youth Authority for a seven‐year post‐parole period to examine the relationship between changes in local life circumstances and criminal activity. We extend previous research by employing a statistical model that accounts for the joint distribution of violent and nonviolent crime during the late teens and twenties in order to present information on patterns of criminal activity during a newly recognized developmental period of the life course, “emerging adulthood.”     

Justice,Fairness, and World Ownership

It is a central tenet of most contemporarytheories of justice that the badly-off have aright to some of the resources of the well-off.In this paper, I take as my starting point twoprinciples of justice, to wit, the principle ofsufficiency, whereby individuals have a rightto the material resources they need in order tolead a decent life, and the principle ofautonomy, whereby once everybody has such alife, individuals should be allowed to pursuetheir conception of the good, and to enjoy thefruits of their labour in pursuit of suchconception. I also endorse the value offairness, whereby the right person orinstitution makes the decision as to whether tobring about justice.I show that justice and fairness can besatisfied only if we all enjoy a combination ofprivate and collective rights over the world.In making that case, I shall argue that the setof ownership rights I advocate differs fromreadily available conceptions of restrictedprivate ownership in two important respects.First, it is such that in some circumstances,two individuals or more can have control rightsover the same property at the same time, not,as is standardly the case in legal systems, bycontracting with one another (through gifts andjoint purchase), but simply on grounds ofjustice. Second, it allows that, if necessary,property-owners be expropriated from theirproperty without compensation.