Juvenile Justice Advocacy: Practice in a Unique Court

The defense attorney must remember that the Juvenile Court is a court and not a social agency. But the fact that it is a court should not obscure the fact that it is a court with social objectives and social techniques. Thus, he must have the knowledge and ability to suggest alternative treatments to court adjudication.     

Uncovering the Dangerous Alliances, 1495–1980

The empirical literature has found that interstate alliances are, with the exception of the nineteenth century after 1815, usually followed by war rather than by peace. This analysis tries to identify theoretically the characteristics of alliances that distinguish those that are followed by war from those that are followed by peace. It is argued that alliances that embody settlements of territorial disputes are most peaceful. Alliances consisting exclusively of major states or of states that have been successful in their last war are predicted to be war prone, while those that have the opposite characteristics are predicted to be followed by peace. An empirical analysis of the data shows that all of the above expectations are confirmed. The analysis concludes by using these characteristics to reexamine the classic Levy, 1981, study.     

Abortion and Partisanship in the 104th U.S. Congress

The new Republican majorities in the 104th Congress conducted a coherent campaign to erode abortion rights. Avoiding a hopeless attempt to overturn the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision, congressional Republicans pressed numerous anti-abortion initiatives. Analysis of the votes on those initiatives reveals a clear partisan pattern – a large majority of congressional Republicans are hostile to abortion rights while most congressional Democrats usually act to protect and even extend them. Therefore, the liberal versus conservative conflict which characterises the congressional parties on economic issues is also visible in the abortion issue.     

Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer

Laboratory methods are used to evaluate the effects of institutional arrangements and rent-defending activity on rent-seeking auction outcomes. In part, Nash equilibrium predictions are a useful behavioral guide: As predicted, more rents are dissipated in perfectly-discriminating auctions, where the high-bidder wins, than in lotteries, where relative bids determine the chance of winning. Also as predicted, the introduction of a rent-defending buyer reduces social costs. Nevertheless, the social costs of rent-seeking consistently exceed predicted levels. Moreover, individual bidding, especially by buyers, deviates markedly from Nash predictions.