Maximizing models of legislative choice

A number of recent studies have reported estimates of single equation and simultaneous equations models of the decisions of state legislatures. These investigations have been ‘economic’ ones, in the sense that considerations of the relative costs and benefits to some self-interested person or group capable of affecting legislative outcomes have motivated the choice of explanatory variables. Thus, perhaps implicitly, these studies have assumed utility maximization by some critical agent(s) in the political marketplace. This essay draws attention to the implications of this maximizing assumption for the proper specification and estimation of the associated empirical models.     

Pricing in the nuclear power industry: Public or private interest?

This paper tests empirically the Ramsey version of the public-interest theory of regulation by examining the pricing practices in the nuclear power industry, using a 1985 cross-sectional sample of 40 electric utilities. Other researchers have avoided this segment of the industry because of difficulties with nuclear fuel data, or perceived differences in the underlying production function. We show that regulators respond to political influences according to the Stigler-Peltzman version of regulation and that Ramsey pricing cannot be validated, at least for the nuclear segment of the electric power industry.     

Urban Environment, Genetics, and Crime

Gene-environment interactions are important for the development of much human behavior. We examined the possibility that a genetic propensity to criminal behavior interacts with the type of environment in which an individual is raised. Using a cohort of adoptees, we found evidence for independent contributions of biological parent criminality (genetic influence) and urban environment rearing to prediction of adoptee criminality, but no evidence for a gene-environment interaction involving these factors.     

The Human Subjects Protection Committee: An Experiment in Decentralized Federal Regulation

The human subjects protection committee is the principal legal mechanism for protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research. In this article the author explores the influence of variations in the structure of the review process and in the composition and operating procedures of the committees on committee performance. He also assesses revisions in the review process proposed by the National Commission on the Protection of Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.