MANAGING RETALIATION: DRUG ROBBERY AND INFORMAL SANCTION THREATS*

The notion that informal sanction threats influence criminal decision‐making is perhaps the most important contribution to neoclassical theory in the past 15 years. Notably absent from this contribution is an examination of the ways in which the risk of victim retaliation—arguably, the ultimate informal sanction—mediates the process. The present article addresses this gap, examining how active drug robbers (individuals who take money and drugs from dealers by force or threat of force) perceive and respond to the risk of victim retaliation in real‐life settings and circumstances. The data's theoretical implications for deterrence and violence contagions are explored. Data were drawn from in‐depth interviews with 25 currently active drug robbers recruited from the streets of St. Louis, Missouri.     

Exploring Explanations of State Agency Budgets: Institutional Budget Actors or Exogenous Environment?

Budgetary incrementalism argues that three institutional actors—agencies, executive budget offices, and legislative committees—dominate budget outcomes. The complexity and interdependency of public programs expands this expectation to include the influence of exogenous budget factors. Findings from a survey of state agency heads reveal that budget environments do influence state agency budget outcomes. However, the institutional budgetary participants, especially governors and legislatures, envisioned in classical incrementalism retain their principal and primary influence on state agency budgets. A significant departure from classical incrementalism is that agencies are not as influential as previously depicted.     

Effects of Administrators' Aspirations,Political Principals' Priorities,and Interest Groups' Influence on State Agency Budget Requests

This article addresses a long‐standing question in public budgeting: What factors influence bureau/agency budget request decisions? Empirical results confirm the complexity of variables that explain different levels of budget requests by over 1,000 state administrative agencies. The expected significant influence of administrator (agency head) aspirations was clearly present. But other important sources enter into the decision of agencies to satisfy rather than maximize. These include the strategic roles, activities, and priorities of governors, legislatures, and interest groups. These political principals' influence operates to constrain, discipline, or even augment agency budget requests.     

PLANNING AND CONTROLLING PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN THE UK, PART II: THE EFFECTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SURVEY

Part I of this article [spring 19921 examined and explained the processes by which the Treasury plans and controls public expenditure through the Public Expenditure Survey. This second part analyses the survey's effects and effectiveness. Throughout we assess the survey by the extent to which the principal functions of planning, allocating, controlling and evaluating public expenditure are articulated and performed. We use four sets of criteria. Firstly, the survey is assessed as a means of regulating the interdependent relationships of the principal participants. Secondly, as a system for making decisions about public expenditure, the survey is judged by the extent to which it has enabled governments to achieve their broad spending objectives. Thirdly, the survey is assessed b the extent to which it provides directly for the participation of ministers collectively in tie process of decision-making, and how they decide the relative priority of both the total of public expenditure and its composition. And fourthly, its effects are measured by analysing the outputs of the system - the allocation of spending to departments and agencies. In the concluding section we address directly the question of whose interests are best served by the survey.     

PERCEPTUAL DETERRENCE AMONG ACTIVE RESIDENTIAL BURGLARS: A RESEARCH NOTE*

The research reported here is based on a comparison of active residential burglars and a matched control group regarding their willingness to commit a burglary at varying levels of certainty of arrest, severity of penalty, and anticipated reward. Initial analyses revealed that few controls were willing to offend regardless of risk, penalty, or reward and that offenders were not influenced by penalty on its own. Consequently, responses of the offenders only were further analyzed in relation to the impact of risk, penalty, and reward. The results of a logit analysis indicated that both risk of being caught and prospect of increased gain had a significant influence on the offenders' decision making.     

DO PARENTS MATTER IN CREATING SELF‐CONTROL IN THEIR CHILDREN? A GENETICALLY INFORMED TEST OF GOTTFREDSON AND HIRSCHI'S THEORY OF LOW SELF‐CONTROL*

Gottfredson and Hirschi's general theory of crime (1990) has generated an abundance of research testing the proposition that low self‐control is the main cause of crime and analogous behaviors. Less empirical work, however, has examined the factors that give rise to low self‐control. Gottfredson and Hirschi suggest that parents are the sole contributors for either fostering or thwarting low self‐control in their children, explicitly discounting the possibility that genetics may play a key role. Yet genetic research has shown that ADHD and other deficits in the frontostriatal system are highly heritable. Our research thus tests whether “parents matter” in creating low self‐control once genetic influences are taken into account. Using a sample of twin children we find that parenting measures have a weak and inconsistent effect. We address the conceptual and methodological issues associated with the failure to address genetic influences in parenting studies.