Iraq's New Constitution: Recipe for Stability or Chaos?

The key to Iraq's future stability and prosperity ultimately depends not on the daily struggle to improve security, but on devising a new and workable constitution. Approval of a draft Constitution in a referendum in October 2005 has not ended the debate: the Sunni Arabs in particular remain bitterly opposed to some of its provisions, especially those on federalism. Negotiations are to resume shortly on possible amendments to the Constitution, and the newly elected Council of Representatives has the daunting task of drafting the large number of laws needed to implement it. This analysis looks at the key clusters of issues which continue to divide Iraq's communities and at the prospects for enduring compromises, as well as the impact of this bold constitutional experiment on other states in the region. It concludes that overcoming the main threat to success—the stoking of sectarian tendencies by continuing violence—ultimately requires Iraq's leaders to adopt a mindset which puts the common good ahead of short-term sectarian advantage. These leaders have shown in the past their ability to make the necessary compromises to keep the political process on track and, with strong support from the international community, are likely to do so again. The new constitution can therefore provide the basis for a stable and prosperous Iraq, as well as a powerful example for others in the region.     

Administration, Governance, and Policy Tools in Welfare Policy Implementation

Landmark welfare reform legislation passed in 1996 has been operating by legislative extensions since its expiration in September 2002. At this writing, reauthorization has been derailed by controversy over various legislative proposals. In this article, we contribute to the welfare policy debate by studying the importance of specific policy tools and the role of public administration in the dramatic fall in welfare caseloads from 1996 to 2000. Using administrative and survey data on welfare programs in 44 states, we test our theory that caseload reduction is a function of administrative commitments, policy design, and administrative actions linked to five sets of governance variables: environmental factors, client characteristics, treatments, administrative structures, and managerial roles and actions. We find strong evidence that administrative action to move clients into work, coupled with administrative commitments, can provide important links between policy goals and policy outcomes.     

Gore Vidal’s Anti-Jewish nationalism

Edward Alexander is professor of English at the University of Washington and at Tel Aviv University in Israel. He is author of, among other works, Matthew Arnold and John Stuart Mill; The Resonance of Dust; Isaac Bashevis Singer;and, most recently. The Jewish Idea and Its Enemies.     

Binding Prometheus: How the 19th Century Expansion of Trade Impeded Britain's Ability to Raise an Army

This article explores how the dramatic expansion of British trade in the decades prior to World War I affected Britain's ability to raise an army. We first develop a simple institutionally based model of British army recruiting which we then perturb by expanding trade while holding all other variables constant. Our theoretical analysis suggests that the expansion of trade would impede Britain's ability to raise an army, a prediction that finds substantial support in the historical record using both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that trade enhances a state's military power, we find that the expansion of trade did not ease Britain's resource constraints by making labor more freely available for military purposes. Rather, by raising the civilian demand for labor, the expansion of trade made labor more expensive and difficult to mobilize, even as a more effective army became more important to British strategy.     

Risk aversion and rent-seeking: An extension and some experimental evidence

Theoretical investigations indicate that the risk attitudes of individuals will effect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent-seeking activities. Following this line of investigation we extend Hillman and Katz's work to a small numbers case and demonstrate that the degree to which a monopoly rent is dissipated is dependent upon the structure of the risk attitudes of two risk averse individuals.Our earlier laboratory results were evaluated with respect to the risk neutral Cournot-Nash predictions. However, given the uncertainty present in the rent-seeking experiment, our ability to reject these risk neutral predictions may not be, in fact, a failure for the model but a result of risk aversion. In laboratory experiments in which we control for the relative risk attitudes of individual agents, we show that risk aversion matters. The relative risk aversion of individuals affects the level of rent-seeking activity and the extent to which rents are dissipated. In our experiments, the relatively less risk averse individuals dissipated relatively more rent.     

Developing the relevance potentialities of national security and foreign policy research: Some proposed criteria

While effective foreign and national security policy-making increasingly requires research that is produced outside government, little is known about how such research affects the actions of policy-makers, or why it may or may not be policy-relevant to them. This essay poses a number of criteria which can be used to weigh the policy relevance of applied social science research for national security and foreign policy issues. These criteria can be divided into content and process categories, the former including aspects of time, issue salience, format, and confidence; and the latter incorporating questions related to the origin of research, the strategy which informs it, and the tactics by which it is presented. Hopefully, such criteria can be applied to existing works, serve as guidelines for future research, and perhaps illuminate the general role of social knowledge in policy formulation.The authors wish to express their appreciation for the opportunity to participate in the National Security Education Seminar held at Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colorado, June 18–July13, 1973, directed by Fred A. Sondermann and conducted under the auspices of the National Security Program, New York University, Frank N. Trager, Director. This paper is a revised version of a report originally prepared for the seminar. The views presented here are those of the authors, and not necessarily of any of the institutions with which they are associated.