Past Reflections, Future Insights: African Asylum Law and Policy in Historical Perspective

This article argues that an understanding of the evolution ofasylum is an essential ingredient in the search for ideas andperspectives to the plight facing forced migrants. Using Kenyaas a case study, the paper evaluates the extent to which proceduresused to determine claims for asylum, protection outcomes andentitlements met international human rights and refugee lawstandards. It is contended that limited resources, porous boundariesand the mass movement of asylum seekers have compromised thelevel of protection offered to those who seek surrogate protectionin African states like Kenya. In conclusion, critics in thearea of asylum are challenged to undertake historical studies,as a way towards offering best practise lessons for those involvedin the protection of persons forced to flee their home states.     

MOVING INTO GLOBAL COMPETITION: A Case Study of Alabama's Recruitment of Mercedes-Benz

Globalization is changing the game of economic development, but the emerging rules and optimal strategies remain somewhat unclear. The Mercedes case discussed in this article illustrates the rough and uncertain nature of this transition. From the perspective of the traditional strategy, the price of the jobs initially promised by Mercedes seemed high; and the ultimate cost was increased by the intense competition among the bidding states. Yet from another perspective, the incentives offered by Alabama can be viewed as “table stakes” for the new global game of economic development.     

Cost disease versus Leviathan explanations of rising government cost: An empirical investigation

In this paper we reexamine the apparently conflicting empirics of Borcherding et al. (1977) versus those of Barry and Lowery (1984). The latter, designed to test the cost disease versus bureau voting power hypotheses on US Citibase annual data between 1947 to 1979, was retested for the longer period available through 1989. Second, and more importantly, we isolate and test for the presence of a second channel for the exercise of bureaucratic power. That channel is the bureau's ability to use its information advantage to capture a portion of newly generated government rents through higher personal benefits (such as higher salaries). Such an analysis (following West, 1991) requires first that those factors generating new rents for government actually result in successful bureaucratic rent-seeking in the form of higher compensation levels. In addition, the analysis requires that these “artificial” increases in bureaucratic wages show up as significant determinants of the higher cost of providing government services. Incorporating a constructed Kau/Rubin variable into the Barry and Lowery database is then shown to improve the predictive power of both the cost disease and bureaucratic power hypotheses for US annual data between 1948 and 1989.