MOVING INTO GLOBAL COMPETITION: A Case Study of Alabama's Recruitment of Mercedes-Benz

Globalization is changing the game of economic development, but the emerging rules and optimal strategies remain somewhat unclear. The Mercedes case discussed in this article illustrates the rough and uncertain nature of this transition. From the perspective of the traditional strategy, the price of the jobs initially promised by Mercedes seemed high; and the ultimate cost was increased by the intense competition among the bidding states. Yet from another perspective, the incentives offered by Alabama can be viewed as “table stakes” for the new global game of economic development.     

Basic problems in the theory of uneven and combined development. Part II: unevenness and political multiplicity

Where does ‘the international’ come from? What accounts for its existence as a dimension of the human world? This article attempts an answer, in three steps, using the idea of ‘uneven and combined development’ (U&CD). First, a depth model is constructed, comparing different ways of linking uneven development with international relations. Thus far, it turns out, these ways have all presupposed the fact of political multiplicity, rather than explaining it. In search of explanation, the article turns, secondly, to the compelling historical sociological argument of Barry Buzan and Richard Little. This locates the origins of geopolitics in the late prehistoric shift from hunter-gatherer to settled agricultural existence, together with associated processes of social differentiation and proto-state formation. Buzan and Little's explanation appears at first to pre-empt the need for the concept of U&CD. Yet closer inspection reveals that unevenness and combination play a key role in their empirical account without, however, being theorized. The third step of the argument therefore seeks to show how these are necessary parts of the process of social change which Buzan and Little describe. And in this way it emerges that the origins of ‘the international’ do indeed lie in the uneven and combined character of historical development.     

Health reform and employee health benefits programs

The impact of health reform on employee health benefits programs could be dramatic. Depending on the health reform program adopted, employers could face significant new regulatory and economic burdens in operating employee health benefits programs or could find themselves greatly relieved of such burdens. President Clinton's proposal, in particular, would dramatically alter today's practices. This article focuses on how the Clinton proposal would change employee health benefits programs. Although President Clinton has indicated a willingness to compromise, his legislation may prove to be a house of cards, with all provisions interdependent. Employers should study all pending proposals carefully and weigh in on the debate so as to ensure that lawmakers are fully educated before making potentially irreversible decisions.     

Cost disease versus Leviathan explanations of rising government cost: An empirical investigation

In this paper we reexamine the apparently conflicting empirics of Borcherding et al. (1977) versus those of Barry and Lowery (1984). The latter, designed to test the cost disease versus bureau voting power hypotheses on US Citibase annual data between 1947 to 1979, was retested for the longer period available through 1989. Second, and more importantly, we isolate and test for the presence of a second channel for the exercise of bureaucratic power. That channel is the bureau's ability to use its information advantage to capture a portion of newly generated government rents through higher personal benefits (such as higher salaries). Such an analysis (following West, 1991) requires first that those factors generating new rents for government actually result in successful bureaucratic rent-seeking in the form of higher compensation levels. In addition, the analysis requires that these “artificial” increases in bureaucratic wages show up as significant determinants of the higher cost of providing government services. Incorporating a constructed Kau/Rubin variable into the Barry and Lowery database is then shown to improve the predictive power of both the cost disease and bureaucratic power hypotheses for US annual data between 1948 and 1989.