Forcible Stops: Police and Citizens Speak Out

A recent federal district court decision found that the New York City Police Department engaged in unconstitutional policing. Officers stopped millions of minority young men over the span of several years. Most of those stopped were innocent of any wrongdoing. This article uses qualitative and quantitative research methods to investigate these inequities, examining the views of both the police and those who were stopped. The authors find that pressure on officers emanating from headquarters was responsible for much of the illegal behavior by lower‐level officers. Additionally, youth in minority neighborhoods felt mistreated by the police; this led to distrust in the police. The authors suggest solutions to ameliorate this painful episode in police practice. The article concludes with specific recommendations such as reducing management pressure on officers and police developing community partnerships.     

An economic model of social sensitivity: The case of individual criminal behavior

In general, economists have modeled criminal behavior as a problem in time allocation under uncertainty. Their Friedman-Savage utility models have been based on the binomial probability distribution and then tested using aggregate data on crime rates and neglect the nonpecuniary aspects of crime. This paper overcomes the shortcomings of previous work. Specifically, criminal activity is modeled with an underlying geometric probability process and explicitly accounts for the moral and social compromise involved in becoming a criminal. The empirical model enables the quantification of the criminal's moral and social sensitivity using data based on a consolidated file of police records and a cohort survey of criminals and noncriminals. On the basis of this unique data set, it is found that the included individual criminals are risk averse and that gang membership reduces social sensitivity.     

A local regulator's rewards for conformity in policy

This note is an empirical investigation of the benefits that accrue to local building departments for a regulatory policy that conforms to the relative strength of local interest groups. The study uses an interest group model and applies it to data for building departments in 1100 municipalities. It finds that material benefits in terms of budgets and salaries go to building agencies which set a strictness of regulation that reflects the balance of interest group strengths in the locality.