Gerrymandering Roll Calls in Congress, 1879–2000

We argue that the standard toolbox used in electoral studies to assess the bias and responsiveness of electoral systems can also be used to assess the bias and responsiveness of legislative systems. We consider which items in the toolbox are the most appropriate for use in the legislative setting, then apply them to estimate levels of bias in the U.S. House from 1879 to 2000. Our results indicate a systematic bias in favor of the majority party over this period, with the strongest bias arising during the period of "czar rule" (51st–60th Congresses, 1889–1910) and during the post-packing era (87th–106th Congresses, 1961–2000). This finding is consistent with the majority party possessing a significant advantage, either in "buying" vote options, in setting the agenda, or both.     

The dynamics of European party systems

Nomination: Changing patterns of electoral volatility by Richard S. Katz, p.83
Nomination: To swing or not to swing by Hans Rattinger, p.86
Reflections: Dynamics of European party systems A catalyst for a discussion by Mogens N. Pedersen, p.93     

Political Data in 1996

European Journal of Political Research -