A Reconsideration of the Political Significance of Shared Responsibility Agreements

The 1996–2007 Howard Coalition government introduced Shared Responsibility Agreements in 2005 to allocate discretionary funding to indigenous communities in a “mutually responsible” way. The policy was widely criticized as an ineffective and ideologically driven “showpiece”. Its significant governance‐building dimensions went without comment. Through the deployment of the conceptual tools of contract and governance, SRAs established new and depoliticised relationships between government and indigenous peoples, replacing the centralized political structure of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission. The future of the policy under the Rudd Government is uncertain, but understanding the impacts and implications of SRAs remains important.     

Mary Wollstonecraft on Politics and Friendship

How, exactly, might friendship be relevant to politics? Friendship between political actors can be hypothesised to have specific effects; friendship between individuals in society can be hypothesised to have specific political outcomes; or friendship and politics can be understood to be conceptually connected. Mary Wollstonecraft makes friendship a central concept in her political theory of social justice and good government. This article analyses how politics and friendship are related in her texts, exploring her arguments that friendship in society is a condition of just government, but also suggesting that for Wollstonecraft friendship and citizenship are congruent with one another, and hence that the connection between politics and friendship is conceptual as well as causal.     

Reaching for the Philosopher's Stone: Contingent Coordination and the Military's Response to Hurricane Katrina

When Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Mississippi Gulf Coast in August 2005, it immediately overwhelmed the abilities of local and state emergency management officials to respond to the ensuing disaster. Although the U.S. Coast Guard and some military units were on scene shortly after the passage of the storm, there seemed to be interminable delays before the military forces began to arrive in numbers to both provide humanitarian relief and secure the affected areas. This article analyzes the response of the National Guard, active-duty military, and Coast Guard forces through the lens of coordination. We find evidence of the successful use of both traditional hierarchical and network-based coordination; we also find support for Donald Kettl's idea of "contingent coordination."