The Political Economy: Political Attitudes and Economic Behavior

It has long been recognized that voters bring their political behaviors in line with economic assessments. Recent work, however, suggests that citizens also engage in economic behaviors that align with their confidence—or lack thereof—in the political system. This alignment can happen consciously or, as we suggest, unconsciously, in the same way that positivity carries over to other behaviors on a micro-level. Using monthly time series data from 1978 to 2008, we contribute further evidence of this relationship by demonstrating that political confidence affects consumer behavior at the aggregate level over time. Our analyses employ measures more closely tied to the theoretical concepts of interest while simultaneously accounting for the complex relationships between subjective and objective economic indicators, economic behavior, political attitudes, and the media. Our results suggest that approval of the president not only increases the electorate’s willingness to spend money, but also affects the volatility of this spending. These findings suggest that the economy is influenced by politics beyond elections, and gives the “Chief Economist” another avenue by which they can affect the behavior of the electorate.     

Ready to Bargain: The Effect of Fiscal Stress on Supermajority Requirements to Raise Taxes

This paper analyzes the interaction effect between fiscal stress and supermajority requirements to raise taxes. I hypothesize that fiscal stress nullifies the effects of supermajority requirements, making states with and without supermajority requirements equally likely to raise taxes during these periods. This conclusion was drawn from a theory on how fiscal stress affects the legislative bargaining environment. The hypothesis was tested using data from 49 states from 1980 to 2010, and the results confirmed expectations. This research contributes to a growing literature that suggests that the effect of institutions cannot be analyzed without considering the context of the political environment.     

CHILDREN'S LAWYERS IN CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW COURTS

There simply is no dos-and-don'ts checklist that will address the myriad issues facing children's attorneys and eliminate the difficult questions that face them. Conscientious lawyering is the key to alleviating potential ethical culpability. This requires the commitment of significant time to learn about the child client and his or her special needs. Unique responses are often required to meet individual problems. Beyond that, attorneys for children are left to determine their own subjective criteria to guide their representation.¹
The child is a person, not an object of concern.²     

Bared buttocks and federal cases

Her recent publications include Equity and Gender: The Comparable Worth Debateand Property Rights and Eminent Domain,both published by Transaction.     

Disclosure of child sexual abuse: expressed emotions and credibility judgments of a child mock victim

Both lay persons and professionals believe that the emotions displayed by a child witness during disclosure of sexual abuse are a factor of importance when judging the child's credibility. Unfortunately, not all children display emotions according to expectations, leading to misjudgments, and possible miscarriage of justice. In the present study, we examined how lay people's credibility judgments were influenced by a child's displayed emotions during the disclosure of sexual abuse. Participants (n?=?119), viewed video recordings of a mock police interview of an 11-year-old child actor disclosing sexual abuse, displaying one of four emotional expressions (angry, sad, neutral, and positive). Results showed that participants were strongly influenced by the emotions displayed; in particular, the display of strong negative emotions (anger) or positive emotions during disclosure significantly reduced judged credibility. The credibility ratings predicted the participant? judgments of the defendant's guilt and the willingness to pass a guilty vote in a hypothetical trial.     

Changes in the Most Cited Scholars in Five International Journals Between 2006 and 2020

Asian Journal of Criminology - The main aim of this article is to assess the most cited scholars in five international journals in three time periods: 2006–2010, 2011–2015, and...     

The limits of tax and expenditure limits: TEL implementation as a principal-agent problem

Previous scholarship has shown that Tax and Expenditure Limits (TELs) often fail to constrain government growth. This paper views the implementation of TELs as a principal-agent problem. Agency theory predicts that delegation is affected by the preferences of agents and the costs of monitoring those agents. Using panel data for the US states from 1970 through 2008, I conduct an empirical test of the validity of the principal-agent model for TELs. I find that state spending limitations are only effective at cutting the growth of state and local spending under the direction of agents who have a preference for limited government. Additionally, state property tax limitations are only effective when monitoring does not require costly coordinated action. These findings contradict an alternative theory of TEL implementation that looks towards the policy’s origin. My research suggests that the arrangements of delegation determine when and under what conditions TELs effectively reduce government growth.