How Public Officials Gain Policy Influence—Lessons from Local Government in Sweden

That public officials influence public policy is generally agreed upon, but the issue of how individual officials gain this influence is less developed in the literature. Here, the stories and experiences of 10 officials, active in local environmental governing in Sweden, are used to identify, describe, and discuss key strategies for gaining policy influence. The result shows the importance of accessing key politicians; avoiding isolation within the administration; developing long-term strategies; and being skilled in communication, networking, and generating external resources. The way these officials act and think challenges some well-established theoretical notions and adds empirical insights to the democratic dilemma of bureaucratic power.     

A retrospective study of drugged driving in Norway

The National Institute of Forensic Toxicology, Oslo, receives blood and urine samples from all Norwegian drivers apprehended on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. In 1983 we received samples from 1446 drug-suspected drivers, out of which 445 underwent toxicological analysis. The drugs found most frequently were tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) (n = 199), diazepam (n = 166) and amphetamine (n = 102). A cautious interpretation of the data indicate that about 200 of the 445 subjects selected for toxicological analysis drove under severe influence of drugs. Because of the high percentage of submitted cases not analysed for drugs, this figure represents a minimum estimate. Compared with the results from 1978, we found a several-fold increase in detections of THC and amphetamine in 1983. The number of diazepam detections did not increase in a similar way, but we estimated that the diazepam detections would have increased 3-fold if we had analysed as frequent for this drug in 1983 as in 1978.     

Der Europ?ische Gerichtshof als Motor der Integration: Eine akteursbezogene Erkl?rung

For nearly five decades, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has developed a decisively pro-European case law and has become the ??engine of integration??. Institutional explanations shed light on the Court??s room for manoevre. They have to be complemented by actor-centered explanations that shed light on the judges?? motives of action. The explanation offered by the following paper is unfolded in two steps. In the first one, the article describes idiosyncrasies of the European law discourse that already shaped the judges before they were appointed. The analysis of the idiosyncrasies corresponds to a scepticism towards the idea of national sovereignty, a belief in the necessity of creative and idealist, law-augmenting judges and a dominance of output-oriented legitimization strategies. In a second step, the article shows that in the sociological sense the ECJ judges constitute a group. While the individual judges share an understanding of the aims and functions of European law, the group develops its own identity and grants status to those who perform successful actions with respect to the common integration agenda. This explanation is more realistic than ??rational choice?? explanations which point to the direct and personal benefits that judges derive from their pro-European case law.     

Hague Case Law — Latest Developments

Netherlands International Law Review -     

The Capitalist Peace

It is widely accepted that democracies are less conflict prone, if only with other democracies. Debate persists, however, about the causes underlying liberal peace. This article offers a contrarian account based on liberal political economy. Economic development, free markets, and similar interstate interests all anticipate a lessening of militarized disputes or wars. This "capitalist peace" also accounts for the effect commonly attributed to regime type in standard statistical tests of the democratic peace.     

Organizational Behavior and Economic Growth: A Norwegian Perspective*

By using game-theory, it is indicated that encompassing organizations may participate in dilemma games with free-rider problems. Next, examinations of institutional details of Norwegian corporatism point out that creative or productive strategies may be quite likely even among small interest organizations. In the last section it is argued that the assumption of economic growth being a collective good is more acceptable the larger the public sector. Again, institutional details need to be in focus. The model closing the paper dwells on whether comprehensive organizations really have stronger incentives to choose creativity rather than to fight for redistributions. A general affirmative answer cannot be provided.