Parteiendemokratie im Wandel — Reaktionsstrategien von politischen Parteien

Ohne Zusammenfassung Rezension zu: Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Müller und Fritz Plasser (Hg.): Parteien auf komplexen W?hlerm?rkten. Reaktionsstrategien politischer Parteien in Westeuropa. Wien: Signum 1999, 403 S., DM 88,-.     

Political actors,preferences and election rule re-design in Russia and Ukraine

Institutional designers, international organizations and post-Soviet political actors have directed considerable attention to the design and conduct of elections in postcommunist states. This article explores the nature of electoral system re-design by investigating the motives and interactions of legislators, parties and presidents. Following the veto players literature, the analysis focuses on the determinants of policy stability and change. The process of institutional re-design is evaluated in two cases: the successful introduction of the Law on Political Parties in Russia and unsuccessful attempts at major election reform in Ukraine. The article shows that the outcomes of policy reform processes in these 'superpresidential' systems were not solely determined by presidential preferences. Rather, to fully understand election system re-design, it is critical to evaluate the preferences of all relevant veto players.     

TECHNOLOGY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN CHINA: Commercialization Reforms in the Science and Technology Sector

A vital component of China's reforms in the area of science and technology (S&T) activities during the last two decades has been improving the commercial exploitation of technology generated in research institutes. This article analyses the various concepts and measures introduced to guide policies for the commercialization of technology as well as various approaches employed by the Chinese government in the light of theories of market‐pull innovation and public choice.     

Adaptive governance as a reform strategy

This article expands research on adaptive governance in natural resource and climate change policy into other policy areas and the larger context of reform. The purpose is to clarify adaptive governance as a reform strategy, one that builds on experience in a variety of emergent responses to the growing failures of scientific management, the established pattern of governance. Emergent responses in information technology, national security, development aid, and health care policy are reviewed here. In these cases, factoring a large national or international problem into many smaller problems, each more tractable scientifically and politically, opened additional opportunities for advancing common interests on the ground. The opportunities include simplification of research through intensive inquiry, participation in policy decisions by otherwise neglected groups, and selecting what works on the basis of practical experience rather than theory. What works can be improved incrementally in the context at hand, diffused through networks for voluntary adaptation elsewhere, and used to inform higher-level decisions from the bottom up. Adaptive governance is a promising strategy of reform. The open question is whether it will be used well enough to sustain a once-progressive evolution toward fuller realization of human dignity for all.     

FDI and the costs of contract enforcement in developing countries

This article examines the relationship between foreign direct investment and host countries’ contracting institutions, the rule systems which govern commercial transactions between private actors. Given their liability of foreignness and costly exit options, we suggest that multinational corporations have incentives to influence the formal contracting environment in host countries. Further, host governments are more likely to respond to multinationals’ wishes when they are more dependent on foreign capital markets. We draw on the World Bank’s Lex Mundi dataset (Djankov et al. 2003) on micro-level contracting environment for private actors. Our analysis of a cross section of 98 developing countries suggests that FDI is associated with lower contract enforcement costs, particularly when the host country is more indebted.     

How Explicit Racial Prejudice Hurt Obama in the 2008 Election

Some commentators claim that white Americans put prejudice behind them when evaluating presidential candidates in 2008. Previous research examining whether white racism hurts black candidates has yielded mixed results. Fortunately, the presidential candidacy of Barack Obama provides an opportunity to examine more rigorously whether prejudice disadvantages black candidates. I also make use of an innovation in the measurement of racial stereotypes in the 2008 American National Election Studies survey, which yields higher levels of reporting of racial stereotypes among white respondents. I find that negative stereotypes about blacks significantly eroded white support for Barack Obama. Further, racial stereotypes do not predict support for previous Democratic presidential candidates or current prominent Democrats, indicating that white voters punished Obama for his race rather than his party affiliation. Finally, prejudice had a particularly large impact on the voting decisions of Independents and a substantial impact on Democrats but very little influence on Republicans.