The socio‐economic structure of European democracies

The article presents the findings of a factor analysis concerning socio‐economic structure and socio‐economic development in sixteen European democracies. The socio‐economic structure of these nations consists of three dimensions: level of affluence, level of industrialisation and degree of urbanisation. A prominent feature in the change of the contemporary social structure of Western Europe is the weakening of the relationship between affluence and industrialisation. Statements about the implications for political life of socio‐economic structure and socio‐economic development entering into theories about modernisation and social mobilisation may be clarified and tested only if socio‐economic concepts are made operational in terms of a set of indicators, the interaction between which can be stated by means of factor analysis and used in the construction of indices.     

Governance in the European union

Governance in the EU. Edited by GARY MARKS, FRITZ W.SCHARPF, PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER and WOLFGANG STREECK. London: Sage, 1996. Pp.192, biblio, index. £37.50 (cloth); £12.95 (paper). ISBN 0–7619–5134–2 and ‐5135–0.

Elitism, Populism, and European Politics, Edited by JACK HAYWARD. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp.265, index. £35 (cloth). ISBN 0–19–828035–1.

Adjusting to Europe. The Impact of the EU on National Institutions and Policies. Edited by Y. MÉNY, PIERRE MULLER and JEAN‐LOUIS QUERMONNE. London and NY: Routledge, 1996. Pp.181, index. £40 (cloth); £13.99 (paper). ISBN 0–415–14410–8 and ‐14409–4.

Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi‐Level Governance. Edited by LIESBET HOOGHE. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp.458, biblio., index. £40 (cloth). ISBN 0–19–828064–5.

The European Union and Members States. Towards Institutional Fusion? Edited by DIETRICH ROMETSCH and WOLFGANG WESSELS. Manchester and NY: Manchester University Press, 1996. Pp.382, index. £45 (cloth). ISBN 0–7190–4809–5.

The Impact of European Integration. Political, Sociological and Economic Changes. Edited by GEORGE A. KOURVETARIS and ANDREAS MOSCHONAS. Westport and London: Praeger, 1996. Pp.335, index, annotated biblio. £51.95 (cloth). ISBN 0–275–94952–4.

European Welfare Policy. Squaring the Welfare Circle. Edited by VIC GEORGE and PETER TAYLOR‐GOOBY. Pp.224, tables, index. Macmillan, 1996. £11.99 (paper). ISBN 0–333–60917–4.

European Integration and Disintegration. East and West. Edited by ROBERT BIDELEUX and RICHARD TAYLOR. London and NY: Routledge, 1996. Pp.298, index. £45 (cloth); £13.99 (paper). ISBN 0–415–13740–3 and ‐13741–1.

The European Union: How Democratic Is It? Edited by SVEIN ANDERSEN and KJELL A.ELIASSEN, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi: Sage, 1996. Pp.295, biblio, index. £13.95 (paper). ISBN 0–7‐619–5113‐X.

Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union. By MICHAEL NEWMAN. London: Hurst, 1996. Pp.236. £30 (cloth); £10.95 (paper). ISBN 1–85065–256–2 and 255–4.     

The Impact of Public Branding: An Experimental Study on the Effects of Branding Policy on Citizen Trust

Branding has become common in the public sector as brands are increasingly used to influence citizens’ associations with public organizations and public services. Using experimental research replicated in three European countries, this article investigates the effect of using the European Union (EU) brand on trust in policies. Experiments were conducted among economics students in Belgium, Poland, and The Netherlands to test the hypothesis that adding EU brand elements to policies positively affects trust in those policies. The results show a consistent positive and significant effect of applying the EU brand to trust in the policies in all countries and for both policies included in the experiment—even in The Netherlands, a country characterized by a negative overall EU sentiment. These findings provide some of the first empirical evidence of the effectiveness of branding for public policy.     

The Value of Participation: Exploring the Role of Public Consultations from the Vantage Point of Interest Groups

Consulting interest groups is commonplace in the preparation of policies by democratic governments. It is often assumed that interest groups participate in consultations primarily for the purpose of influencing policy. This article goes beyond this simplified claim and empirically explores the role of consultations from the vantage point of interest groups. Drawing on the Swedish formalized referral process known as the ‘remiss procedure’ the article shows that interest groups not only participate in consultations in order to effectively change the policy proposal under consideration, but they also use the output of the process in other venues for policy influence, such as direct political contacts and opinion making, and to establish themselves, or maintain their status as legitimate actors in the eyes of the government. In addition, the remiss procedure appears to be intertwined with the groups’ own ‘internal life’, promoting the development and anchorage of policy positions within the organizations. These insights are important for further understanding the promises, as well as the perils, of public consultation.     

The Rich are Different: The Effect of Wealth on Partisanship

Rich voters tend to be Republicans and poor voters tend to be Democrats. Yet, in most settings it is difficult to distinguish the effects of affluence on partisanship from those of closely related variables such as education. To address these concerns I use state lottery and administrative records to examine the effect of changing economic circumstances on the partisanship of over 1,900 registered voters. Winning larger amounts in the lottery produces a small increase in the probability an individual is later a registered Republican, an effect that is larger for those who registered to vote after winning. This suggests that wealth does affect partisanship, particularly for those without preexisting attachments to a political party. Comparing estimates from the lottery to cross-sectional data suggests the latter exaggerates the relationship between wealth and partisanship, although controlling for additional variables produces largely similar estimates.     

Democracy for the youth? The impact of mock elections on voting age attitudes

Should 16-year-olds be entitled to participate in elections? We theorize that mock elections for adolescents, who are not eligible to vote, affect the short-term support among the general public for lowering the voting age. To test our theoretical expectation, we utilize variation among municipalities in the organization of mock elections during the Danish local elections in 2009. Difference-in-difference estimates with data from the subsequent local elections in 2013 demonstrate that citizens in municipalities with mock elections for adolescents were more supportive of lowering the voting age and that their support was strongly rooted in ideological differences.     

Does participation in international organizations increase cooperation?

Recent research asserts that public commitments to international institutions promote behavior that is consistent with institutional purposes. Evidence for this proposition is based almost entirely on studies that compare the behavior of states that have and have not ratified treaties. This paper evaluates instances in which some member states temporarily experience increased entanglement with an IO because they or their nationals serve in a position of authority. Unlike selection into IOs, selection into positions of authority is often governed by a common, observable, and partially exogenous process. I exploit exogenous exit, random assignment to different term lengths, and competitive elections in three contexts: the International Criminal Court (ICC), the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), and the UN Security Council (UNSC). The evidence implicates that acquiring a position of authority can make states more willing to reject U.S. advances to sign non-surrender agreements, adopt domestic legislation that changes the penal code (ICC case), ratify legally binding treaties (UNHRC case), and contribute to peacekeeping missions (UNSC case). On the other hand, there is no evidence that UN institutions successfully select more cooperative states for positions of authority. Similar research designs can gainfully be employed to identify the causal effects of other forms of institutional participation.