The coalition of the willing: Effect of country diversity in an environmental treaty game

It is analyzed how size differences among countries affect the benefits from climate coalitions. It is shown that size differences lead to smaller coalitions and greater benefits than coalitions among identical countries. The importance of trigger strategies for supporting cooperative solutions is considered. A real world example, based on the world’s six largest emitters, is used to illustrate the implications of size differences in terms of emissions versus valuations of benefits. Climate coalitions become smaller when ranking in terms of benefits is different from ranking in terms of emissions. Three cases of benefit valuations are considered: benefits equal (i) share in world emissions, (ii) share in world GDP, and (iii) share of world population.     

Ministers,Markets and Missiles: The British Government,the European Economic Community and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1964–68

Existing accounts of British efforts to achieve a nuclear non-proliferation treaty between 1964 and 1968 largely overlook the later stages of decision making within the Labour government. Scrutiny of previously classified sources reveals that a desire for entry into the European Economic Community had a much larger influence on the content and conduct of British non-proliferation policy than previously suggested. By 1967, Prime Minister Harold Wilson sought a secondary role in treaty negotiations, and left the running to the superpowers. This avoided unnecessary conflict with the countries of the Community, resentful of the Treaty's discriminatory terms, and helped to protect Britain's application to join the EEC. Although this bid was unsuccessful, ambitions for future membership continued to influence non-proliferation policy in 1968. Indeed, a desire for future entry into the EEC helps to explain why Britain became the first nuclear weapon state to ratify the Treaty.     

A People's Court: Emotion,Participant Experiences,and the Shaping of Postwar Justice at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 1946–1948

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946–1948) or Tokyo IMT is overlooked for its contributions to modern international criminal justice. Convened to hold Japanese leaders accountable for conspiring to commit aggression, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes during the Second World War, the IMTFE was both a groundbreaking judicial undertaking and a pioneering multilateral institution. This distinction makes it a unique vehicle for exploring the fundamental challenges of both international justice and organisation. Institutions like the IMTFE are usually viewed through broad geopolitical, legal, and ideological lenses. Although important, these approaches miss a singularly important dimension of multilateralism: the human contingencies that impact international bodies. Using unique participant sources, this article presents an intimate “trial's-eye-view” of how working at the IMTFE affected the emotions, psychology, and temperament of its personnel. Participant responses on these very personal levels had profound consequences on the tribunal's proceedings, findings, and legacy. Other factors shaped justice in Tokyo, but the responses identified here were common, and their impact significant. Ultimately, this paper argues that people and their experiences—as much as anything—produced the outcome of justice in Tokyo.     

Marketization reforms and co-production: Does ownership of service delivery structures and customer language matter?

In public services that are tax funded, public goods are sometimes marketized by being delivered using private companies instead of public organizations. In addition, marketization reforms can entail service users being described as customers for the service rather than as citizens. We assess the effects of these aspects of marketization reforms on users' willingness to co-produce public services. First, service delivery using private companies risks reducing users' willingness to co-produce because firms cannot commit ex ante to not appropriate donated labour for private gain. Second, using customer-oriented language risks reductions by priming individualistic market norms that lower prosocial motivation compared to citizen-oriented language priming citizenship duty. Using three survey experiments in the United States, we find that delivery structures are not neutral. Private firms delivering local public services reduce users' willingness to co-produce, although similar effects are not evident from primimg customer rather than citizenship thinking.