Competing Concerns: Balancing Human Rights and National Security in US Economic Aid Allocation

This paper theorizes that the effect of human rights violations on US economic aid is conditioned by the salience of US national security concerns. National security concerns will be more salient in situations where recipients contribute to maintaining US security and in temporal eras when the USA is perceived as being under increased external threat. As the relational and temporal salience of national security increases, any negative effect of human rights violations on US economic aid should decrease. I test this hypothesis by examining US economic aid allocations to states from 1977 to 2005. The results show that the salience of national security concerns present in the US-recipient relationship does condition the relationship between human rights violations and US economic aid. There are also significant differences between different temporal eras of US foreign aid allocation. Future work should address how conflicts between interests and values in US foreign policy are negotiated.     

Coup Risk,Counterbalancing, and International Conflict

Contrary to the literature on rallies-around-the-flag, this article argues that, in some circumstances, leaders may use international conflict to promote domestic divisiveness. More specifically, the threat of a military coup generally prompts leaders to divide their militaries (a practice known as counterbalancing), and even to engage in international conflict to ensure that various branches of their own armed forces remain distrustful of one another. Two empirical tests of these claims are offered: a large-N statistical analysis that examines whether coup risk leads to counterbalancing, and whether counterbalanced nations engage in more low-level military conflict (controlling for other causes of conflict); and a case study of Georgia shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Both empirical studies support the arguments advanced by the authors.

     

A note on modelling labour migration in LDCs

Taking the family as the rural‐to‐urban migration decision‐making unit, will the ‘expected‐income migration model’ accurately predict the level of migration? Consideration of two variables ‐ desire for leisure, and a version to risk ‐ serves to show that the expected‐income model yields a systematic downward bias in the predicted level of rural‐to‐urban migration. Likely policy implications emanating from the incorporation of these variables in the migration decision are indicated.     

Characterizing the Performance of Pipe Bombs

Pipe bombs of steel or PVC fragment in reproducible patterns when similarly configured. The power of the explosion correlates with number, mass, and size of the fragments recovered, where a large number of small, low‐mass fragments indicate a high‐power event and vice versa. In discussing performance, describing pipe fragmentation pattern by fragment weight distribution mapping (FWDM) or fragment surface area distribution mapping (FSADM) was useful. When fillers detonated, detonation velocities of ~4.4 mm/μs were measured. In such cases, side walls of the pipe were thrown first; the average fragment velocity was ~1000 km/s. In deflagrations, the end cap was first thrown; fragment velocities were only ~240 km/s. Blast overpressures varied; at 10 feet, 2 × 12 inch steel pipes containing ~550 g of detonable mixture produced overpressures of 5–6 psi; similar nondetonating pipes produced less than 2 psi. Maximum fragment throw distances were 250–300 m, with an average of ~100 m.