Congressional Performance,Incumbent Behavior,and Voting in Senate Elections

Conventional wisdom suggests that individual members of Congress have no real incentive to act in ways that might improve public evaluations of their collective body. In particular, the literature provides no clear evidence that public evaluations of Congress affect individual races for Congress, and little reason to expect that voters would hold specific individuals responsible for the institution's performance. We suggest that this conventional wisdom is incorrect. Using multiple state‐level exit polls of Senate voting conducted by Voter News Service in 1996 and 1998, we arrive at two key findings. First, we find that evaluations of Congress do have a significant effect on voting within individual U.S. Senate races across a wide variety of electoral contexts. Second, we find that punishments or rewards for congressional performance are not distributed equally across all members, or even across members of a particular party. Instead, we find that the degree to which citizens hold a senator accountable for congressional performance is significantly influenced by that senator's actual level of support for the majority party in Congress, as demonstrated on party votes.     

Underwriters' counsel as gatekeeper or turnstile: an empirical analysis of law firm prestige and performance in IPOs

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. Key points

• The article investigates the relationship betweenpricing in an initial public offering (IPO) and the prestigeof the participating underwriters’ law firm.
• The hypothesisof the article is that law firm quality affects how law firmsperform their obligations in IPOs—more prestigious lawfirms acting more independently. Consistent with this hypothesis,the authors find a negative relationship between pre-IPO priceadjustment and the participation of prestigious underwriters’counsel, and a negative relationship between the participationof prestigious underwriters’ counsel and initial return,which is consistent with market trading reflecting the decreasedrisk associated with offerings involving prestigious underwriters’counsel.
• Finally, it is found that certain observable characteristicsindicating diminished likelihood of undisclosed negative information(venture backing and quality of the issuer's counsel) are associatedwith an increased likelihood that prestigious underwriters’counsel is used.