The Determinants of Vote Intentions in Portugal

This paper offers new insights on theinteractions between economics and politicsin Portugal. We use two unexplored datasets consisting of monthly polls on voteintentions for the main political partiesin Portugal and responses to a consumersurvey containing a battery of questions oneconomic evaluations. The analysis coversthe interval from 1986 to 2001. We findthat: (1) right-wing governments arepenalized for higher inflation while theleft-wing ones are not, (2) left-winggovernments are more penalized forincreases in the unemployment rate; (3)voters base their evaluations ofincumbents' performances on perceptions ofpast and current economic conditions,rather than on expected future economicoutcomes.     

Election results and opportunistic policies: A?new?test?of?the?rational political business cycle model

The literature on the rational PBC suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chances of reelection. Most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre-election distortions in fiscal policy. We propose a new test that explores the two-way interaction between the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion and the margin of victory. The test is implemented using a large panel of Portuguese municipalities. The results show that opportunism leads to a larger win-margin for the incumbent and that incumbents behave more opportunistically when their win-margin is small. These results are consistent with the theoretical model.     

Designer Psychostimulants in Urine by Liquid Chromatography–Tandem Mass Spectrometry,

Designer psychostimulants are known by recreational drug users to produce a complex array of adrenergic and hallucinogenic effects. Many of these drugs are not targeted during routine toxicology testing and as a consequence, they are rarely reported. The purpose of this study was to develop a procedure for the detection of 15 psychostimulants in urine using liquid chromatography–tandem mass spectrometry (LC‐MS/MS), specifically 2,5‐dimethoxy‐4‐bromophenethylamine (2C‐B), 2,5‐dimethoxy‐4‐chlorophenethylamine (2C‐C), 2,5‐dimethoxy‐4‐methylphenethylamine (2C‐D), 2,5‐dimethoxy‐4‐ethylphenethylamine (2C‐E), 2,5‐dimethoxyphenethylamine (2C‐H), 2,5‐dimethoxy‐4‐iodophenethylamine (2C‐I), 2,5‐dimethoxy‐4‐ethylthiophenethylamine (2C‐T‐2), 2,5‐dimethoxy‐4‐isopropylthiophenethylamine (2C‐T‐4), 2,5‐dimethoxy‐4‐propylthiophenethylamine (2C‐T‐7), 2,5‐dimethoxy‐4‐bromoamphetamine (DOB), 2,5‐dimethoxy‐4‐chloroamphetamine (DOC), 2,5‐dimethoxy‐4‐ethylamphetamine (DOET), 2,5‐dimethoxy‐4‐iodoamphetamine (DOI), 2,5‐dimethoxy‐4‐methylamphetamine (DOM), and 4‐methylthioamphetamine (4‐MTA). Analytical recoveries using solid‐phase extraction were 64–92% and the limit of detection was 0.5 ng/mL for all drugs except 2C‐B (1 ng/mL). The assay was evaluated in terms of analytical recovery, precision, accuracy, linearity, matrix effect, and interferences. The technique allows for the simultaneous detection of 15 psychostimulants at sub‐ng/mL concentrations.     

Identifying Irregularities in Mexican Local Elections

A generalized distrust in Mexican local elections raises the question of whether electoral corruption has vanished or remains a prevalent practice in the country. To answer this question, I analyze the 2010 gubernatorial elections, exploiting a feature of the country's electoral system: within each electoral precinct, voters are assigned to polling stations according to their childhood surname. Consequently, the only difference between voters in contiguous polling stations should be their last names. Given that political preferences are seldom correlated with voters' names, I use suspicious differences in turnout levels across contiguous polling stations to identify fraudulent practices. The findings of this article indicate that nondemocratic enclaves that actively obstruct the completion of Mexico's democratic transition still remain today.