Religion,liberty and economic development: An empirical investigation

The empirical investigations conducted for this paper show that one can not accept the null hypothesis that religion and liberty are not related to development. Judeo-Christianity in particular appears to an important determinant of economic development. This is explained in part by its fostering of the private ownership of property. Nations with the Judeo-Christian values are more likely to have political democracies that are conductive to economic development. Capitalist economies with Judeo-Christian democracy are more likely to have higher levels of economic development.     

Managing economic crises: The role of the state in Bahrain and Kuwait

Bahrain and Kuwait adopted sharply divergent responses to the economic crisis in the Gulf during the 1980s. The Bahraini government reduced the level of state intervention in the local economy, opened up opportunities for private investment and relied on the operation of the unregulated market; Kuwait's government, on the other hand, imposed a greater degree of state supervision over domestic economic affairs and expanded central planning to allocate resources to the most profitable enterprises. Two influential bodies of neo-Marxist writing on the state—the state-derivation school and the writings of Claus Offe—have difficulty accounting for these differences. A more adequate explanation for Bahraini and Kuwaiti policy can be formulated in terms of the strength of each country's indigenous rich merchant community relative to that of the ruling family/central administration and the political activities of the labor movement in each amirate. Fred H. Lawson is associate professor, Department of Government, Mills College, Oakland, CA 94613. He received his Ph.D. from UCLA in 1982 and has also taught at the University of North Carolina and Smith College. His most recent publications include “Political-economic trends in Ba'thi Syria: a reinterpretation,”Orient 29 (December 1988) and “Libéralisation économique en Syrie et Irak,”Maghred/Machrek 128 (April–May 1990). He is currently exploring the connection between class conflict and foreign policy in contemporary Syria and Iraq.     

PLEA BARGAINING AS A GAME: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATED SENTENCING DECISIONS

Current studies of courtroom decisionmaking emphasize contextual variation and the interaction of large numbers of variables In explaining decision outcomes. However, theory suggests that courtroom decisions may be dominated by simple "rules of thumb" that allow decisionmakers to cope with scarcity of time and resources. Following this approach, a parslmonious model of plea bargaining as a two-person game is developed and hypotheses are derived. Data on negotiated sentences for burglary and robbery in three California counties serve to test the hypotheses. The findings confirm that prior criminal history is the dominant factor in determining the severity of negotiated sentences and that defendents with more extensive prior records have less incentive to plea bargalh. Identlfication of this decision rule for negotiated sentences contradlcts arguments for limiting plea bargaining that assume negotiations result in sentencing leniency across the board.