Assessing the President's Role as Party Agent in Congressional Elections: The Case of Bill Clinton in 2000

Presidents have become their parties' chief fund‐raisers and thus have the capacity to further their parties' collective fortunes by imposing a more efficient distribution of campaign resources than might otherwise prevail. In order to succeed, presidents must, first, accurately target their efforts where they will best improve candidates' prospects for winning seats, and second, either directly or indirectly (through signaling to other donors) generate sufficient new resources to affect the election outcome. Analyses of Bill Clinton's extensive fund‐raising efforts during the 1999–2000 election cycle confirm that presidents can indeed use their unmatched fund‐raising ability to help their parties win congressional contests they might otherwise lose. But analysis of the Clinton record also shows that presidential fund‐raising activities may be shaped by other purposes that lead to a distribution of effort that is suboptimal for the party.     

The Right to a Family Environment for "Children Living in Exceptionally Difficult Conditions"

Building on earlier, non-binding international instruments, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides a right to a family environment for children in general, but it also elaborates this right in a variety of contexts in which children are in especially difficult conditions. These provisions are legally binding in the scores of countries that have ratified the Convention. Such provisions are also illustrative of the Convention's conceptual coherence and comprehensiveness, its broad "constitutional" language, and its establishment of structures for monitoring and implementation.     

GENERAL DETERRENCE AND TELEVISION CABLE CRIME: A FIELD EXPERIMENT IN SOCIAL CONTROL*

This research examines the deterrent effect of a written legal threat on a group of persons who are known to be receiving an unauthorized premium cable television signal. The experiment attempts to determine (1) the overall violation rate: (2) the extent to which violators direr from a systematic random sample of cable signal customers (according to age, total household income, and gender); and (3) the deterrent effect of the threat of intervention. Additionally, a six-month follow-up was conducted to assess the duration of the threat's effect. Overall, two thirds of the subjects (n=67) reacted to the threat; the major reaction to the threat was an attempt to hide the violation. There were some differences found regarding participation in cable crime and deterrence, but none reached a reliable level of statistical significance. Regarding deterrence, the findings that males heeded the threat least and that the youngest and richest also showed low desistance rates after exposure to the threat are consistent with previous research. Regarding participation in cable crime, the youngest and richest seem to be involved more often in the pilfering of signals. The follow-up revealed that the deterrent effect of the intervention lasted at least six months. The benefits of using experimentation as a general deterrence research strategy are emphasized throughout.     

Reliability and validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys on party positioning

This research note reports on the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys (CHES), which measure national party positioning on European integration, ideology, and several European Union (EU) and non‐EU policies. The reliability of expert judgments is examined and the CHES data are cross‐validated with data from the Comparative Manifesto Project, the 2003 Benoit‐Laver expert survey and the 2002 Rohrschneider‐Whitefield survey. The dataset is available on the CHES website.     

How Parties Create Electoral Democracy,Chapter 2

Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. Instead, a new round of competition begins, with legislators as voters and party leaders as candidates. The offices at stake are what we call “mega‐seats.” We consider the selection of three different types of mega‐seats—cabinet portfolios, seats on directing boards, and permanent committee chairs—in 57 democratic assemblies. If winning parties select the rules by which mega‐seats are chosen and those rules affect which parties can attain mega‐seats (one important payoff of “winning”), then parties and rules should coevolve in the long run. We find two main patterns relating to legislative party systems and a country's length of experience with democratic governance.     

SURRENDER OF JUDGMENT AND THE CONSENT THEORY OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY

The aim of this paper is to take the first steps toward providing a refurbished consent theory of political authority, one that rests in part on a reconception of the relationship between the surrender of judgment and the authoritativeness of political institutions. On the standard view, whatever grounds political authority implies that one ought to surrender one's judgment to that of one's political institutions. On the refurbished view, it is the surrender of one's judgment – which can plausibly be considered a form of consent – that makes political institutions practically authoritative.