Dissecting White-Collar Crime: Offense Type and Punitiveness

It is commonly asserted that the public is indifferent toward white-collar crime and hence is reluctant to “get tough” with more “respectable” criminals. However, such a contention fails to consider that there are many varieties of upperworld criminality and that the punitiveness of the public may differ markedly according to the type of offense involved. Based on a 1981 survey conducted in Galesburg, Illinois, we have attempted to investigate whether the criminal sanctions prescribed by citizens will vary when the broad category of white-collar crime is “dissected” into its component types. The data suggest that (1) there is considerable variation in punitiveness by type of offense; (2) while street crimes are generally given the harshest sentences, violent forms of white-collar illegality are accorded severe sanctions that exceed those meted out for some F.B.I, crimes; and (3) there is little support for the notion that the public responds leniently to upperworld crime.     

PUBLIC SECTOR PAY BARGAINING: COMPARABILITY, DECENTRALIZATION AND CONTROL

Public sector pay, as a key component of public expenditure, has been a major issue for government since the mid-1970s. This article analyses public services pay bargaining since 1979 and examines the continuing tension between the control of public sector pay levels on the one hand and the wish to make pay levels more responsive to external market forces on the other.
The article concentrates on the changes in pay bargaining in the public services. It does not purport to provide a detailed economic analysis of the outcomes of the various phases in public sector pay policy, but does attempt to explain the process implications of the political contingencies and rationale driving government policy on pay determination. In particular it notes the resilience of national pay-setting arrangements and pay comparability throughout most of the period under review, despite the political rhetoric, emphasizing the pragmatism of government policy. The latter section of the article reviews the current policy, with its emphasis on decentralized pay determination, and considers these new developments within the context of private sector collective bargaining theory.
The evidence from the private sector suggests that pay determination in the private sector is complex and that levels of bargaining relate to various factors. Decentralization is neither a panacea for poor performance nor necessarily problem free. Devolved pay determination can lead to problems of control over costs and, in the context of high levels of trade union organization, to pay'leapfrogging'. The article concludes that there is a continuing contradiction between the role of the government as an employer, keen to devolve pay decisions to local level, and that of economic regulator with responsibility for the wider economy. This continuing tension indicates that decentralized pay bargaining in the public sector will be limited in its scope by some form of central government control.     

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND PUBLIC SPENDING PRIORITIES IN THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE

Abstract. In a study published in 1980, Alan Lewis found that members of the British mass public tend to have clearly defined preferences on spending in specific policy areas and that these preferences are closely related to party identification. This paper examines Lewis's conclusion in the American setting. Data on eleven spending policies from the 1973 and 1980 General Social Survey are examined via factor analysis and multiple classification analysis. While some change is observed between 1973 and 1980, the preferences of the American public on public expenditures appear to be quite stable and, contrary to Lewis's findings these preferences are unrelated to party identification.     

A Study on Improvement of Criminal Sentencing in Korea: Determinants in Fraud Cases

The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the process of judges' sentencing in Korea. Drawing on an empirical data set of the fraud cases, the study proposes (1) to identify the determinants of judges' sentences (2) to contribute to the development of a methodology for the study of sentencing by showing how to conceptualize abstract research questions and finally (3) to identify the scope of an individual judge's discretion. The results of data analysis reveal several interesting points. First, there exists considerable discrepancy in sentencing among individual judges. Such a problem strongly suggests that it is necessary to reform and renovate the current sentencing system so as to guarantee more reasonable sentences. Second, the most important factor determining sentencing is the quantity of prosecution that prosecutors demand. Based on this result, it might appears that Korean prosecutors faithfully execute their jobs to defend the public good. However, it is also quite possible that the defendant is not able to challenge the prosecutor effectively in the trial process. If this is the case, it deserves serious attention, especially in Korea where a publically-sponsored defending attorney is provided only on very limited occasions. Because this study is being based on a limited number of cases (313 fraud cases), the findings should not be over-generalized. To make sound and proper generalizations, more cases need to be analyzed.