Treating Voters as an Afterthought? The Legacies of a Decade of Electoral Modernisation in the United Kingdom

Over the past decade, the UK's New Labour government has been at the forefront of efforts internationally to modernise electoral procedures, promising to deliver 'an e-enabled, multi-channel general election by 2006'. This paper considers the origins and the impacts of reforms to UK electoral procedures with a particular focus on the adoption of postal voting on demand and pilots of electronic voting and counting since 2000. The paper concludes that the principal legacy of the modernisation agenda to date is likely to have been a negative impact on public confidence in the electoral process.     

Forced Exits: Accounting for the Removal of Contemporary Party Leaders

This article seeks to account for the remarkably high number of British party leaders who have been forced to leave office in recent years. In particular it seeks to explain why numerous leaders have felt compelled to resign following pressure from party colleagues. It is suggested that four general factors may be of importance: i) the increased importance of perceptions of leadership; ii) the rise of ‘celebrity’ politics; iii) erosion of traditional public–private divides, and; iv) increased professionalism amongst parliamentarians. The article refers to both the forced exit of leaders of all the major British political parties as well as the removal of leaders of parties within the devolved regions of the UK.     

Mutualizing Europe's Debts

Because they have failed to address the fundamental economic imbalances within Europe obscured by the single currency, each effort by European leaders so far to resolve the euro crisis has only deepened it. Without a decisive move toward fiscal and political union, accompanied by policies that push productivity and competitiveness toward convergence while closing the democratic deficit, the Eurozone will disintegrate. To discuss the way forward, the Nicolas Berggruen Institute's Council on the Future of Europe met in Rome on May 28 with Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti. In this section we publish the contributions from that meeting by the former European leaders, scholars and Nobel laureates who are members of the Council.     

Crises and Paradigm Shift

Crises can force leaders and technocrats together, highlight failures and, more rarely, precipitate changes in ideological worldview and the prevailing consensus. In 2007–8, the worst financial and economic crises since the Great Depression of 1929 caused a paradigm shift in financial and regulatory ideology. G20 leaders and central bankers reasserted collective power and authority over financial markets and global banks to an extent and in a manner not seen since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971. The retreat of state authority reversed direction. The spell of the ‘mystical Anglo‐Saxon model of liberalisation and deregulation’ was broken. In 2014 the paradigm shift is still underway and still under attack by recalcitrant bank CEOs and their lobbyists, but the shift may be durable—signalling a major change in international regulation of the world's largest financial markets and firms.     

Reinventing Reforms: How to Improve Program Management Using Performance Measures. Really

This paper looks at the design and use of incentivized performance measures to motivate managerial efficiency and promote greater program effectiveness. It starts off by looking at recent reforms like the Government Performance and Results Act to understand why they were largely unsuccessful in altering the decision‐making process of government agencies. One problem was that performance measures have been both numerous and complicated, thereby making their role in management and oversight difficult. Equally important, no external incentives were attached to program accomplishments. The paper then examines what elements would be needed to build a management system that encourages both more efficient and more effective agency behavior. The goal of performance budgeting is to develop performance measures that display the progress of a program toward its stated objectives. Assessments based on these measures may then call for rewards or punishments. As such, it also may encourage program managers toward improved performance. The paper examines the pitfalls and complexities dealt with by Congress and Office of Management and Budget in the process. For example, a performance system must distinguish between funding program needs, as warranted by sectoral indicators, and management concerns. It must also unambiguously tie incentives to performance measures to motivate agencies, while building in commitment devices for the principals. Incentivized performance measures may not be appropriate in all conditions, but may be helpful for motivating managers and improving program performance in particular circumstances.