Random Coefficient Models for Time-Series-Cross-Section Data: Monte Carlo Experiments

Jonathan N. Katz Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125 e-mail: jkatz{at}caltech.edu e-mail: nathaniel.beck{at}nyu.edu (corresponding author) This article considers random coefficient models (RCMs) fortime-series–cross-section data. These models allow forunit to unit variation in the model parameters. The heart ofthe article compares the finite sample properties of the fullypooled estimator, the unit by unit (unpooled) estimator, andthe (maximum likelihood) RCM estimator. The maximum likelihoodestimator RCM performs well, even where the data were generatedso that the RCM would be problematic. In an appendix, we showthat the most common feasible generalized least squares estimatorof the RCM models is always inferior to the maximum likelihoodestimator, and in smaller samples dramatically so. Authors' note: We gratefully acknowledge the financial supportof the National Science Foundation. Katz also acknowledges thesupport of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.We are thankful to Jake Bowers, Rob Franzese, Andy Gelman, SandyGordon, Bill Greene, and Luke Keele for comments; to Larry Bartelsfor always reminding us that our judgment may outperform thedata; as well as to the anonymous reviewers of Political Analysis.     

The diminishing role of governments in cable policy

The article examines the role of governments in the transition in cable policy in the three largest media countries of Europe (Britain, France and Germany). In theoretical terms it is argued that the involvement of governments in determining the course of development of cable systems has comprised three main stages. In the first stage, governments tried to ignore cable and prevent the establishment of cable infrastructure. In the second stage, governments regulated the technology in order to promote a national cable policy and encourage the overall development of the broadcasting media. In the third stage, although at different speeds and perceptions, governments deregulated cable by giving permission to market forces to dominate cable's development and abandoning the social goals of cable policy.     

The Influence of Domestic Violence on Preschooler Behavior and Functioning

Enhancing current explanations of domestic violence exposure effects on child cognitive and behavioral functioning was the purpose of this investigation. Participants were 31 domestic violence exposed and 31 non-exposed children ages 3 to 5 years and their single-parent household mothers. Child-mother pairs were matched for child’s age, gender, and ethnicity, mother’s age and education, and annual family income. Child cognitive and behavioral functioning was assessed via psychological assessment and parent report. The presence of mental health difficulties in mothers was assessed using self-report and clinician-administered instruments. Exposed children showed lower verbal functioning and higher internalizing behaviors than did their non-exposed peers. Exposed mothers displayed greater psychological difficulties than did their counterparts.     

Editorial

Ohne Zusammenfassung

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Editorial

     

Editorial

Ohne Zusammenfassung

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Editorial

     

THE POTENTIAL DEMISE OF ANOTHER NATURAL MONOPOLY: RETHINKING THE COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF PERFORMING RIGHTS

In most countries the right to publicly perform music is notadministered individually by the copyright holders but rathercollectively by performing rights organizations (PROs). Thecommon explanation behind the proliferation of collective administrationis that some aspects of copyright administrations are naturalmonopolies. It is often argued that individual administrationis impracticable or at least non-economical. Collective administrationis therefore promoted as the most efficient method for licensing,monitoring and enforcing those rights. In addition, becausethe market is a natural monopoly, regulation, rather than anattempt to foster competition, is thought to be the optimalregulatory response. This is the first in a series of two articlesthat critically analyzes this natural monopoly argument. Inthis article I argue that the case for PROs is not as straightforwardas it is assumed to be. I show that many of the underlying costefficiencies that are attributed to PROs are usually simplyassumed and, in many cases, could be equally achieved underless restrictive arrangements.