Tests of institutional versus non-institutional models of local public expenditure determination

Are institutional or non-institutional factors more important determinants of local public expenditure decisions? Employing data that allows us to directly identify the entire distribution of voter expenditure demands, we estimate models of deviations of actual expenditures from the expenditure demand of defensible benchmarks — namely, the median voter's expenditure demand and the mean of voters' expenditure demands. Three competing paradigms are employed to specify these models; namely, a non-institutional model, the reform government movement's explanation of how institutions affect local government decisions and a transactions-cost model of this same phenomenon. Predictions from these three competing models differ in many respects. Comparisons of results from estimating models of expenditure deviations are found to be generally more consistent with the non-institutional model than with either of the two institutional models. These results suggest that a competitive local public service market helps limit the ability of governments to tax and spend in excess of the demands of the median or mean voter.     

Activating voters in congressional elections

This paper shows that one of the consequences of electoral campaigns is activation. Much research in the last decade has shown that campaign spending is related to electoral outcomes, but nearly all of this research has been conducted on district-level data, so we do not know how campaigns influence individual voters. This research returns to the theoretical framework offered inThe People's Choice and shows that at least part of the effect of campaigns is due to the increased likelihood of people voting when campaigns are more intense.     

A Fast, Easy, and Efficient Estimator for Multiparty Electoral Data

Katz and King have previously developed a model for predictingor explaining aggregate electoral results in multiparty democracies.Their model is, in principle, analogous to what least-squaresregression provides American political researchers in that two-partysystem. Katz and King applied their model to three-party electionsin England and revealed a variety of new features of incumbencyadvantage and sources of party support. Although the mathematicsof their statistical model covers any number of political parties,it is computationally demanding, and hence slow and numericallyimprecise, with more than three parties. In this paper we producean approximate method that works in practice with many partieswithout making too many theoretical compromises. Our approachis to treat the problem as one of missing data. This allowsus to use a modification of the fast EMis algorithm of King,Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve and to provide easy-to-use software,while retaining the attractive features of the Katz and Kingmodel, such as the t distribution and explicit models for uncontestedseats.     

Deception Detection Expertise

A lively debate between Bond and Uysal (2007, Law and Human Behavior, 31, 109-115) and O'Sullivan (2007, Law and Human Behavior, 31, 117-123) concerns whether there are experts in deception detection. Two experiments sought to (a) identify expert(s) in detection and assess them twice with four tests, and (b) study their detection behavior using eye tracking. Paroled felons produced videotaped statements that were presented to students and law enforcement personnel. Two experts were identified, both female Native American BIA correctional officers. Experts were over 80% accurate in the first assessment, and scored at 90% accuracy in the second assessment. In Signal Detection analyses, experts showed high discrimination, and did not evidence biased responding. They exploited nonverbal cues to make fast, accurate decisions. These highly-accurate individuals can be characterized as experts in deception detection.