Committees and the core of the Constitution

An ongoing debate in the formal theory of legislatures involves the question of why these institutions (apparently) manifest so much stability. That is, why do the institutions not continually upset policies adopted only a short time before? A large number of answers have been advanced. This paper proposes that the stability derives from the interaction of two factors, (i) the fundamental constitutional rules (bicameralism, executive veto, and veto override) that structure the legislative process, and (ii) the committee systems endowed with veto powers that many American legislatures have developed. This interaction, we argue, can create a core — a set of undominated points — so large that even a substantial change in the legislature's members (reflecting electoral outcomes, for example) will be unlikely to shift its location enough for the status quo to be upset.     

Tort Reform and Regulation of the Insurance Industry: Medical Malpractice Liability Proposals in 1986

Tort reform was a key issue for state legislatures in 1986.It pitted powerful interests against other powerful interests;it raised basic questions about common law; and it threatenedto alter the federal system by having the federal governmentclaim greater control over tort law and insurance regulation.In this article we set the background that led to this flurryof attention, review the major proposals for reform, and outlinethe actions of both the federal government and state governments.The federal government did little in 1986; it still faces thequestion of whether to preempt traditional state authority inthese areas. At the same time, virtually every state acted in1986. Early in the year, the insurance industry (and physicians)set the debate—its topic, tone, and terms. By the timeother interested parties got organized, many states had actedgenerally following the recommendations of the insurance industry.Later in the year, the debate became more heated, and the insuranceindustry had much more difficulty securing desired state action.As a result, many issues were carried forward to 1987.     

Paying for grades: Impact of merit‐based financial aid on educational quality

In contrast to education reform efforts that target teachers and schools, merit‐based financial aid for college increases the incentives for high school students and their families to directly affect the quality of education by investing more time and effort in schoolwork. Large‐scale merit‐based aid programs, such as Georgia's HOPE Scholarship, seek to improve education by encouraging students to meet higher standards, in this case by obtaining a 3.0 grade point average in high school and college. Since the HOPE program began in 1993, the number of high school graduates qualifying for the aid has steadily increased to more than 38,000 graduates in the class of 1998, or 59.5 percent of the graduating class. At the same time, the relationship between grades and achievement has remained consistent or, in some cases, improved since HOPE began. In fact, African–American males and females with a 3.1 high school core course grade point average have increased their average Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) scores by more than 20 points. This indicates that merit‐based aid has improved the quality of K–12 education in Georgia and reduced racial performance disparities by motivating students and their families to commit greater effort to schooling. © 2002 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The simple analytics of slack-maximizing bureaucracy

Using a utility-based graphical model of bureaucratic choice, this paper develops four empirical predictions from the theory of slack-maximizing bureaucracy. These predictions are compared to those resulting from the Niskanen budget-maximizing model of bureaucracy. Slack-maximizing and budget-maximizing bureaucracies are similar in their response to changes in cost and in their generation of flypaper effects, but they differ in their responses to matching and lump-sum grants.     

Due Process and the Death Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in Capital Trials

Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument during the penalty phase of capital trials can be defined as any disparaging or prejudicial statements calculated to influence the jury to consider improper factors in determining life in prison or the death penalty (Gaskill, 1991, p. 13). Improper statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument may jeopardize a defendant's right to a fair trial. While acknowledging such statements as misconduct, courts sometimes permit them on the theory that the presence of improper statements in closing argument would not change the juries' verdicts and therefore are not fundamentally unfair (Chapman v. California, 1967). The present study examined whether improper statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument during the penalty phase of a capital trial would result in more death penalty recommendations. Three hundred and twenty jury-eligible individuals viewed a videotape based on the penalty phase of an actual capital trial (Brooks v. State, 1977). Individuals exposed to improper statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument recommended the death penalty significantly more often than those not exposed to the statements.