Fatal bicycle accidents--causes and legal responsibility

Ninety-nine bicycle and motorcycle accidents were analyzed that had taken place from 1980 to 1984 in and around Frankfurt on the Main. The postmortem examinations were done in the Center of Forensic Medicine at the University of Frankfurt. Twenty-five percent of the bicycle riders were children up to the age of 15 years and 25% were elderly people over the age of 60. Most of the people involved in motorcycle accidents were between 17 and 24 years of age. The greatest amount of accidents took place in the summer, but in October there was also a peak. On weekdays, Thursday was the day when most of the accidents happened and Sunday showed the least. About 50% of the bicycle accidents happened in the city; 44% of the motorcyclists had lethal accidents on normal roads in the country. The most dangerous situation for bicycle riders was created by fast vehicles following them, but intersections proved to be a danger point, too. Nearly 40% of the motorcycle accidents were not caused by other vehicles. The most frequent cause of death was head injuries (45%), followed by injuries of the internal organs and spine. Many bicycle riders caused the accidents themselves (43.6%). Most of the fatal motorcycle accidents were caused by others (56%). In all of the cases studied, 30% of the participants involved had a relevant blood-alcohol concentration.     

Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny

Policymaking by coalition governments creates a classic principal‐agent problem. Coalitions are comprised of parties with divergent preferences who are forced to delegate important policymaking powers to individual cabinet ministers, thus raising the possibility that ministers will attempt to pursue policies favored by their own party at the expense of their coalition partners. What is going to keep ministers from attempting to move policy in directions they favor rather than sticking to the “coalition deal”? We argue that parties will make use of parliamentary scrutiny of “hostile” ministerial proposals to overcome the potential problems of delegation and enforce the coalition bargain. Statistical analysis of original data on government bills in Germany and the Netherlands supports this argument. Our findings suggest that parliaments play a central role in allowing multiparty governments to solve intracoalition conflicts.     

Editors' Note

Editorial Introduction

Editors' Note     

Crises and their interpretations

Crises are interpreted facts. Thus the sociological term crisis implies that a certain period of economic and political development has been in practice already interpreted as a crisis. Therefore the comparison between the crises 1929 ff. (the beginning of the first world economic crisis and the beginning of the destruction of the first Austrian Republic) and 1974 (the first oilprizeshock and the end of full employment in Western Europe) in Austria must consider two dimensions. First, the authors compare some key-data of the economic and political development. Second, they compare interpretations of the crises by analyzing articles from two Austrian newspapers in each period. The comparison shows-as expected-important differences between the two crises. But it also draws the attention to some unexpected similarities.     

Consistency in sentencing: Recommendation to member states and explanatory memorandum

Documents

Consistency in sentencing: Recommendation to member states and explanatory memorandumCouncil of Europl     

Redistribution of work and income in the crisis: Actors' problems of working time reduction and a guaranteed basic income

In the present mass unemployment the ability of working time reduction to redistribute work and income becomes more clearly limited. In this paper I explore the feasibility of combining a guaranteed basic income with working time reduction in order to enhance the redistribution of work and income in the crisis. An important problem arises however when these programs are combined. The demand for working time reduction applies to a narrower range of interests, but integrates them more strongly, whereas the demand for a guaranteed basic income affects a wider range of interests, but integrates them less strongly. I call this the collectivity dilemma. The solution of this dilemma demands relatively complex cognitive reflexions on the part of the social actors involved.Translated by Andrew Watt