Abu Ghraib, Administrative Evil, and Moral Inversion: The Value of "Putting Cruelty First"

The torture and abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison and at other sites in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Cuba raise disturbing questions that have few, if any, easy answers. Were these intentionally evil acts committed by a few bad apples who took advantage of the power they wielded over the detainees? Or were they cases of administrative evil in which the obvious evil of torture and abuse was masked from the perpetrators, including those who performed subsidiary and supportive functions? The more fundamental question is, are torture and abuse always wrong? How close did the United States come to moral inversion in this case? Judith Shklar’s concept of “putting cruelty first” aids our understanding of this case and points toward a trajectory that could help prevent future moral inversions and administrative evil.     

Realizing the Promise: Government Information Systems and the Fourth Generation of Information Technology

Interoperability is more than “digital plumbing”—making sure that computers talk so that bits of data flow properly. Fundamentally, interoperability is people talking and sharing information. Sharing information reduces the “paperwork burden”on the citizen, streamlines work processes, and enriches the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of policy. Building on prior theory and research, this research has developed empirically derived, practical findings and recommendations to support thedevelopment of appropriate interoperable systems.     

Navigating Get-Tough and Support-Oriented Philosophies for Improving School Safety: Insights from School Administrators and School Safety Staff

American Journal of Criminal Justice - Schools in the United States are increasingly faced with the challenge of navigating two seemingly contradictory approaches to school safety. On the one hand,...     

The Power of Money: Global Capital and Policy Choices in Developing Countries

Extant studies of the impact that international phenomena have on policy choices, and those focused on the political economy of exchange-rate regimes in particular, are incomplete because they do not consider the effect that reliance on global capital has on the policy preferences of domestic groups. Consequently, they cannot explain why some newly emerging market countries pursue fixed exchange regimes under political and economic conditions—such as recently completed elections, uncompetitive export sectors, and poor national economic performance—in which others have altered their policies. I argue that reliance on different types of foreign capital generates distinct capital-specific policy preferences. Furthermore, rather than simply mimicking the preferences of foreign investors, domestic groups are likely to promote policies that reduce their capital-specific risks and vulnerabilities. Panel logit models of exchange-rate regimes in emerging market countries from 1973 through 2000 demonstrate that higher levels of democracy bolster these effects .