Anticorruption agencies: expressive,constructivist and strategic uses

This article explores the reasons for the introduction of anticorruption agencies of a specific type in Eastern Europe. It is argued that one of the important functions of these agencies—which are stronger on information gathering, coordination and strategy rather than on investigation of concrete cases—is to give to the government some leverage over the anticorruption discourse. Presenting the anticorruption commissions and agencies as (discourse-controlling) instruments gives an answer to the troubling question why governing parties are at all interested in the introduction of such bodies. Apart from instrumentalization in political discourse, anticorruption bodies in Eastern Europe have had other effects as well. As shown in the Baltic case, institutional engineering provides for a brief window of opportunity during which political forces committed to integrity could gain the upper hand. The problem in Eastern Europe, however, is not the lack of such windows of opportunities—it is more the lack of really committed political forces capable of continuous and consistent anticorruption effort.     

Quantitative analysis of chlorpromazine by electron spin resonance (ESR) spectroscopy

A simple and sensitive method is described for quantitative analysis of chlorpromazine in blood, serum, urine and tissue homogenate. The chlorpromazine cation radical produced by adding perchloric acid and 2,3-dichloro-5,6-dicyano-p-benzoquinone to the sample can be detected by the ESR method at room temperature. The sensitivity limit is 10 ng, that is, 20 μl of the solution containing 0.5 μg chlorpromazine/ml. The time needed for the measurement is within 10 min. The chlorpromazine radical thus produced is very stable; for example, 95% of the radical was observed after 24 h. The advantage of this method is discussed by comparing with the ordinary spectrophotometry which requires the purification of the sample.     

Constructing Population Control: Social and Material Factors in Norm Emergence and Diffusion

To demonstrate that norms have independent causal power, constructivists de-emphasise material factors related to state interests and highlight social factors. Similarly, they conceptualise international organisations as autonomous from state influence, and focus on cases featuring non-state actors that stimulate a “tipping point” of norm diffusion among states in advance of state sponsorship. By contrast, this article utilises an historical materialist approach that admits both social and material data to examine the contrasting case of population control. It finds that US corporate foundations, eugenist demographers, feminist birth control activists and related NGOs conceptualised and promoted population control in the United States, at the United Nations, and across developing countries. However, the tipping point of norm diffusion occurred only after the United States publicly advocated population control. Indeed, material and social factors were inextricably bound together.