Family Ties and Socio-Economic Outcomes in High vs Low Income Countries

Alesina and Giuliano illustrate that strong family ties lead to lower geographical mobility and reduced labour force participation of young and female individuals. We extend their analysis by arguing that the effect of strong family ties on economic outcomes depends on a country’s level of economic and institutional development. This cross-country heterogeneity arises because strong family ties not only foster traditional family values (which have disruptive effects on economic outcomes), but also provide economically valuable social networks – especially in societies characterised by weak institutions and limited market access. Empirical evidence using the European and World Value Surveys (EVS/WVS) are supportive of our theoretical argument.     

Patriotism, taxation and international mobility

Patriotic citizens intrinsically prefer living in their native country compared to living in the Diaspora. In this paper, we analyze the consequences of such a “patriotic lock-in” in a world with international migration and redistributive taxation. One implication is that countries with more patriotic populations are associated with higher redistributive taxes. We then combine ISSP survey data with OECD taxation data and provide empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. Our results provide a word of caution: the Treasury’s inherent interest in patriotic taxpayers may strengthen the political push for patriotism in an age of globalization and increased mobility.     

Party leaders and voter responses to political terrorism

Public Choice - In this article, we study the political implications of terrorism rooted in extremist political ideologies. Our data uniquely allow studying the potential role of party leader...     

Will you still trust me tomorrow? The causal effect of terrorism on social trust

The absence of a deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in office can be negative or positive for the polity. Some politicians may reduce their efforts, while others may pursue beneficial long-term policies that may be unpopular in the short term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while preserving the willingness to implement long-term policies. The idea is to give politicians the option to choose between a flexible and a fixed pension scheme. While in the fixed scheme, performance has no impact on the pension, the pension increases with short-term performance in the flexible scheme, using the vote share of the officeholder’s party in the next election as a performance indicator. Such a pension choice improves the well-being of citizens since officeholders are encouraged to invest in those activities that are beneficial for society. We analyze the properties and consequences of such a system. Finally, we extend the pension system with choice to non-last-term situations and derive a general welfare result.     

Taxation and presidential approval: separate effects from tax burden and tax structure turbulence?

Previous research has established that taxation may impose significant electoral costs on politicians. This literature, however, focuses exclusively on the effect of the tax burden. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that both the level of the tax burden and the change in the tax structure affect the US president’s approval ratings (over the 1959–2006 period). Our results support this proposition. Specifically, we find a negative impact from the magnitudes of the tax burden and the deficit as well as from changes in the tax structure on presidential approval ratings.     

Success and failure in electoral competition: Selective issue emphasis under incomplete issue ownership

Political parties are often argued to compete for voters by stressing issues they feel they own – a strategy known as ‘selective emphasis’. While usually seen as an electorally rewarding strategy, this article argues that cultivating ‘your’ themes in the public debate is not guaranteed to be electorally beneficial and may even become counter-productive. It describes the conditions under which ‘selective emphasis’ becomes counter-productive, and applies the argument to recent discussions regarding the strategies of mainstream parties confronting the extreme right.     

(De)Centralization and voter turnout: theory and evidence from German municipalities

A vast academic literature illustrates that voter turnout is affected by the institutional design of elections (e.g., compulsory voting, electoral system, postal or Sunday voting). In this article, we exploit a simple Downsian theoretical framework to argue that the institutional framework of public good provision—and, in particular, the distribution of political and administrative competences across government levels—likewise affects voters’ turnout decisions by influencing the expected net benefit of voting. Empirically, we exploit the institutional variation across German municipalities to test this proposition, and find supportive evidence.     

'Rational' Theories of Voter Turnout: A Review

The paradox between an individual's decisions to head to the polls and the absence of strictly rational arguments for this action has intrigued – and troubled – many scholars. The present article surveys various theoretical contributions to resolve this paradox of (not) voting. We assess these approaches based on their ability to explain a number of 'stylised facts' with respect to voter turnout. The main conclusion is that straying away from the behavioural assumptions of the Downsian model provides more realistic models and leads to promising predictions as to the individual's decision to head to the polls. Incorporating the role of (social) groups and learning in particular can be regarded as important strides towards understanding the individual's decision to cast a vote.