Congressional apportionment and the fourteenth amendment

This paper examines state interest in the nine bases of congressional seat apportionment considered for the House of Representatives as part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. We ask, what if voters preferred apportionments that delivered larger vote shares to their state? We then show that among all states, one basis of apportionment was a weak Condorcet winner, while the others were in a vote cycle. In both chambers of Congress, however, pure majority voting created orderings of the nine bases and a different Condorcet winner. Ironically, Congress did not select either Condorcet winner. Instead, a population-based apportionment was reported out of committee and passed both chambers as a consequence of agenda control and lack of pairwise voting. Our analysis provides an example of how agenda setting with incomplete information unintentionally can produce undesirable outcomes for a legislature.

     

Managing Pluralism: The European Case

This article begins by clarifying the meanings attributed to pluralism; it then places the European case in a global context. The body of the article looks at the management of religious pluralism in Europe in terms of commonality and difference. At one and the same time, Europe is becoming increasingly secular and religiously plural—both trends are important if we are to understand the issues at stake. A close examination of four individual cases (Britain, France, the Netherlands and Greece) reveals, however, that it is important not to jump to conclusions regarding outcomes. Each country must be considered on its own terms. The final section introduces a rather different feature: the European Court of Human Rights, noting its place in the management of religious pluralism. A growing jurisprudence emanating from the Court is becoming increasingly influential.