James Bryce: Englishness and Federalism in America and Australia

That the Constitution of the United States served as a modelfor the Australian federation is well established, and is inany case evident from the resemblance of federal institutionsbetween the two countries. Yet substantial differences remain,largely through the determination of the Australian foundersto retain the parliamentary heritage of the Westminster systemof government. It has been pointed out that fames Bryce's lavishexpositions of the American federation distorted American realitieswhen they were viewed through uncompromisingly English lenses.It was Bryce's version of the American federation that allowedthe Australian founders to accommodate their new creation tothe English legacy. However, in Bryce's acclaimed comparativework, his overriding aim was to promote the abiding excellenceof English institutions.     

IMF quotas: Constructing an international organization using inferior building blocks

The International Monetary Fund's structure and rules are based on the quota system that was constructed when the Fund was set up in 1946. Quotas affect contributions and resource availability at the Fund, access to resources, the distribution of Special Drawing Rights, and voting rights. Despite periodic reviews and modifications, the quota system has gradually been eroded and undermined. The fundamental problem is that a single system is attempting to serve four separate and incompatible functions. We illustrate how this erosion has taken place, and how an unreformed quota system will compromise the future operations of the IMF and the international monetary and financial system. Although the difficulties associated with reforming quotas are myriad and complex, the legacy of an unreformed quota system may be profoundly undesirable. We argue that a refined IMF structure must accommodate a clearer separation of a member's contributions to the IMF, its access to IMF resources, and its voting rights at the institution. JEL codes F42 · H79 · H11     

Power Sharing: Institutions,Behavior, and Peace

Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power sharing should therefore reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on whether formal power‐sharing institutions effectively prevent large‐scale violence. We can improve our understanding of the effect of power‐sharing institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To this effect, we compare the direct effect of formal power‐sharing institutions on peace with their indirect effect through power‐sharing behavior. Combining data on inclusive and territorially dispersive institutions with information on power‐sharing behavior, we empirically assess this relationship on a global scale. Our causal mediation analysis reveals that formal power‐sharing institutions affect the probability of ethnic conflict onset mostly through power‐sharing behavior that these institutions induce.     

Editorial

Professor Maitland liked to point out that the beginnings ofthe trust are discernible in a ‘slight but unbroken threadof cases, beginning while the Conquest is yet recent.’¹This forensic Methuselah retains its vitality today becausereams of contractual boilerplate cannot compete with the efficiencyof equity's default rules. These were famously expressed bythe great Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals—laterto become a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States—BenjaminCardozo, in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 NY 458, 464 (1928):

Manyforms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those actingat arm's length, are