Linguistique africaine: De la science exacte à la science morale

During the 2008 Ghanaian election, the threat of violence in northern Ghana, due to an unresolved chieftaincy dispute in the Dagbon Traditional Area, brought the city of Tamale to the brink of widespread conflict. The dispute divided communities on the basis of religion, familial ties, and partisan affiliation. With high stakes, even higher tensions, and party supporters on both sides organized and armed. This article blends interviews and observations in order to explore what occurred during the election and, more importantly, what did not. While the end result diffused the mounting tensions, the underlying factors that brought the community so close to the brink remain. Moving forward, underdevelopment and conflict in the north must be addressed in order to ensure peace and stability in the Dagomba Kingdom and throughout the country.     

Congregational Aid: North American Protestant Engagement in International Relief and Development

A review of large North American Protestant congregations (n = 423) engaging in global relief and development, or ‘holistic mission’ (HM), suggests that half engage in HM activities per year, with the majority of those activities focused on human and physical sectors. Most activities are led by religious NGOs or missionaries and about half are short-term. A mix of proximity, poverty, population, and policy variables direct short- and long-term aid. Findings provide a benchmark for enhancing learning and partnerships among churches, NGOs, and development scholars, ultimately enhancing the efficacy of Protestant aid.     

Terrorist countermeasures

At the end of 1997 the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), and their proxies the South Lebanon Army (SLA), remained hopelessly bogged down in a military quagmire which is played out daily in the hills and valleys of Southern Lebanon. As each new week passed more and more Israeli and SLA soldiers fell victim to the Islamic Resistance's (IR) most effective weapon, the roadside bomb, no amount of “preventive patrolling” could manage to reduce the frequency with which these indiscriminate attacks took place, nor did it confine the planting of these devices to the perimeter of the Security Zone. Having recently completed an assignment with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Brendan O'Shea, of the History Department at University College, Cork, Ireland, investigates the claims of Nabih Berri, Leader of the Shi'ite Amal Movement and Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, that the blood‐spattered hills of South Lebanon have now become “Israel's Vietnam.“¹     

Terrorist Decision Making and the Deterrence Problem

An ongoing debate among policymakers and terrorism scholars concerns the effectiveness of deterrence as a counterterrorism tool. Absent from the debate is a discussion of the complex nature of terrorist decision making. Decisions are made at varying levels in a terrorist organization, often by actors having different motives, resulting in behavior that is not always fully rational. This article identifies several circumstances when terrorist behavior is not the product of an entirely unitary, rational decision-making process, and therefore highlights when deterrence policies will be least effective. It concludes with some policy implications for understanding when deterrence policies are most likely to succeed and how to address terrorism in other situations.     

The role of people in information-sharing: perceptions from an analytic unit of a regional fusion center

Information sharing research has largely focused on capturing operational practices related to the exchange of information. A noticeable shortcoming of this developing literature is the lack of scholarly attention focused specifically on analytic personnel. The present study employs semi-structured interviews with 23 personnel that comprise the analytic unit within a regional fusion center located in a large metropolitan area in the United States. Findings indicate that there is significant ambiguity surrounding the organizational and geographic audiences to which intelligence products should be tailored. Moreover, it appears information sharing is sparse and reliant upon personal relationships between analysts and external organizations. Lastly, analysts do not receive feedback pertaining to the content and effectiveness of intelligence products created. These findings may be generalized to other analytical organizations whose primary goal is to gather, analyze and disseminate intelligence. Action steps for policymakers are provided.