Predicting Peril or the Peril of Prediction? Assessing the Risk of CBRN Terrorism

Since the mid-1990s, academic and policy communities have debated the risk posed by terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Three major schools of thought in the debate have emerged: the optimists, the pessimists, and the pragmatists. Although these three schools of thought draw on the same limited universe of data on CBRN terrorism, they arrive at strikingly different conclusions. Given the highly subjective process of CBRN terrorism risk assessment, this article analyzes the influence of mental shortcuts (called heuristics) and the systemic errors they create (called biases) on the risk assessment process. This article identifies and provides illustrative examples of a range of heuristics and biases that lead to the underestimation of risks, the overestimation of risks and, most importantly, those that degrade the quality of the debate about the level of risk. While these types of biases are commonly seen as affecting the public's perception of risk, such biases can also be found in risk assessments by experts. The article concludes with recommendations for improving the CBRN risk assessment process.     

Twilight on the British Gulf: The 1961 Kuwait Crisis and the Evolution of American Strategic Thinking in the Persian Gulf

The 1961 Kuwait crisis stands as a key event in the evolution of American strategic thinking on the Persian Gulf. Following Iraqi threats to annex Kuwait, Britain despatched a sizable military force to the Emirate hoping to pre-empt an Iraqi invasion. When the Iraqi invasion failed to occur, Britain was forced to weather a political maelstrom as it struggled to withdraw its forces. Although the United States was largely an observer to the crisis, London's actions required Washington to acknowledge the limits of Britain to meet the political challenges of the Middle East and protect Western interests in the region. This realisation provided the impetus for Washington to diversify its strategy in the Persian Gulf and increasingly seek regional solutions for its security concerns.     

Governmental Corruption and Social Change in New Zealand: Using Scenarios, 1950–2020

New Zealand has long enjoyed a reputation as a country with a corruption-free state sector, and ranks very highly on the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (meaning its corruption levels are perceived to be extremely low). However, there is prima facie evidence to suggest that this situation may be changing, not dramatically but significantly. While the state sector changes of the 1980s and early 1990s may be having some impact on this shift, it also has to be understood in the context of wider societal changes, which are probably more decisive. After some brief conceptual clarification, the article presents three scenarios sketching past (1950s/1960s), present (1990s–2006) and future (2006–2020) social and governmental conditions thought to be relevant to corruption levels.     

Reactions to Dating Violence Research: Do Difficulties with Distress Tolerance Increase Negative Reactions?

Recent research has begun to examine whether participants in dating violence studies perceive any benefit from the research and/or experience emotional distress as a result of having participated. Such information is important for Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) and researchers in determining ethical and appropriate protections for participants. In the current study, we examined participants’ reactions to answering questions on dating violence victimization and perpetration utilizing a sample of female college students (N?=?282). We also examined whether distress tolerance was associated with research reactions and moderated the relation between reports of victimization/perpetration and negative emotional reactions to the research. Findings demonstrated that negative emotional reactions to the research did not differ between individuals with or without previous dating violence. Further, distress tolerance had a main effect, but not a moderating effect, on negative emotional reactions to research participation. Implications of these findings for future research and IRBs are discussed.     

Interpreting the Chinese Dream: An Exercise of Political Hermeneutics

Using an approach described as political hermeneutics, this paper interprets the Chinese Dream as a discourse that is historically and politically situated and contextualized within a number of other ongoing narratives and policies in China. This approach is especially apt because, in many respects, the purpose of the Chinese Dream is to round out while also reframe and reemphasize the Party’s longstanding vision of Chinese political and economic development, and to do so ahead of difficult reforms and transitions. Thus, we show how the Chinese Dream should be understood as being a part of a larger historical discourse and pressing needs for change. Consequently, we assemble and discuss the broader narratives that surround and suffuse the Chinese Dream and illustrate how it aims to function as a metanarrative—one that attempts a discursive “reset” under a new leader. As a positive discourse, the Chinese Dream aims to express official visions of the past, present and future; but it must also be understood as part of a web of activities designed to advance Party interests and the various challenges these face. Accordingly, we interpret the Chinese Dream in tandem with discussions of other recent developments, including what appears to be a national rectification campaign as Xi Jinping continues to consolidate power, curtail Party factions and corruption, discipline critics, and prepare the Party and nation for some measure of reform and, likely, some measure of more of the same.     

Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. president George W. Bush articulated a new national security strategy based on striking terrorist organizations and the states that harbor them before they could endanger the United States. Though expressed in the language of preemption, the Bush strategy embodied a far more problematic doctrine of preventive warfare. Whereas the grounds for preemption lie in evidence of a credible, imminent threat, the basis for prevention rests on the suspicion of an incipient, contingent threat. We argue that an American national security strategy that embraces preventive war will set an inauspicious precedent, undermining normative restraints on when and how states may use military force.