Googling the requester: Identity‐questing and discrimination in public service provision

Innovating upon previous field experiments and theories of identity‐based discrimination, we test whether public officials are using searches (“identity‐questing”) to profile citizens and acting on latent biases. Pairs of “institutional” and “noninstitutional” requesters send lower and moderate burden freedom of information (FOI) requests—providing no identity cues apart from undistinctive names, e‐mails, and ID numbers—to nearly 700 of Brazil's largest municipalities. Results show institutional requesters receive one‐fifth more responses than noninstitutional comparators. For moderate versus lower burden requests, noninstitutional requesters are 11% less likely to receive a compliant response than their institutional comparators. The only plausible explanation for these results is identity‐questing, a phenomenon that has far‐reaching policy implications. Most of the world's FOI laws, for example, contain vague ID obligations, which translate incoherently from laws to regulation and practice. Results enjoin public service providers to protect the identities of citizens by default or upon request.     

Political economy of crime and punishment under Stalin

Why do dictatorships favor harsher punishments than democracies? We use a rational choice approach to explain the stylized facts of Stalin’s dictatorship—preference for harsh sanctions, higher incarceration rates, greater use of capital punishment, low tolerance for theft of state property and workplace violations. They are shown to be explained by the preferences of a rational dictator, who does not internalize the social and private cost of punishment.     

Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789–2000

Why does the influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time? Building on prevailing answers, we develop a model, Strategic Party Government, which highlights the electoral motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between parties. We test this theory using the entire range of House and Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic behavior of parties complements members' preferences as an explanation for variation in party influence. Specifically, the strongest predictors of one party's voting unity are the unity of the opposing party and the difference between the parties in the preceding year. Moreover, we find strong links between party behavior in Congress and electoral outcomes: an increase in partisan influence on legislative voting has adverse electoral costs, while winning contested votes has electoral benefits.     

Virginia's Revenue Forecasting Process and Models

In Virginia, major differences between revenue forecasts and actual revenue collections raised questions from legislators about the adequacy of the state's econometric forecasting models and the forecasting process itself. Consequently, Virginia's process and models were examined by the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC), a legislative watchdog agency. The review found most of the differences could be attributed to declining economic factors and not poor forecasting. However, a surprisingly large component of the forecast was based on undocumented judgmental inputs that required greater oversight. Other states in similar circumstances may wish to evaluate their own forecasting process and econometric models using the JLARC approach.     

Warriors in the “new world order”

He writes regularly on matters of strategy. His publications include The Strategic Dimension of Military Manpower;and Paradoxes of Power: The Military Establishment in the Eighties.