A dynamic test of the marginality hypothesis

The marginality hypothesis is an attempt to relate the voting margins of members of Congress to their subsequent legislative behavior. A major corollary of the hypothesis is that members of Congress with small victory margins will be more responsive to constituents than those with large victory margins. This has been assumed to mean that electorally secure representatives can afford to be more loyal to their congressional parties, since they have less cause to worry about their chances for reelection. Previous empirical studies have produced mixed results. We ask the question in a different way: Do changes in marginality affect party voting within Congress? If so, major shifts in the electorate potentially can have a fundamental impact on the behavior of Congress itself. We find that this is not true. Electoral margin is simply not related to party loyalty.     

Can Transparency Foster More Understanding and Compliant Citizens?

Voluntary policy compliance is an important yet rarely studied topic in public administration. To address the paucity of research, this article proposes and empirically tests a conceptual framework that ties policy transparency and policy understanding to voluntary policy compliance intentions. The reasoning is that the extent to which citizens understand a policy contributes to their intentions to comply with that policy. Further, the authors argue that policy transparency indirectly influences voluntary policy compliance intentions through a positive effect on citizens’ levels of policy understanding. To enhance the validity of the findings, the authors assess these relationships across two policy domains. The findings reflect an indirect positive effect of transparency on voluntary compliance occurring through policy understanding. However, this emerged only for one policy domain. These results suggest that the effects of policy transparency on policy understanding and voluntary policy compliance intentions may depend on the policy domain.     

Similar Ends, Differing Means: Contractualism and Civil Service Reform in Denmark and New Zealand

State sector reform was an integral component of the radical economic and social policy changes enacted by New Zealand governments between 1984 and 1991. This reform replaced the traditional tenured public service with a contractual regime. Through a comparison with Denmark, it is shown that New Zealand's reforms were not unique. Similar reforms were enacted in Denmark. But contrary to what occurred in New Zealand, the Danish reforms had already begun in the 1960s, and have since been gradually expanded. The parallel contractual regimes introduced in the two countries are accounted for by an increasing demand among politicians to secure a civil service that is responsive to political executive demands. However, because of institutional differences and diverging regulatory regimes, the strategic approaches in the two countries have been different. Whereas the New Zealand approach was dominated by an appeal to a coherent and sophisticated body of theoretical knowledge, combined with strict formalization, the Danish strategy has been based on political bargaining with the civil service unions. In both cases the reforms rest on critical assumptions regarding their positive and negative implications.     

Reviews

Vladimir Mau, The Political History of Economic Reform in Russia, 1985–1994 (Foreword by Lord Skidelsky; afterword by Egor Gaidar). London: Centre for Research into Communist Economies, 1996, viii + 135 pp. £9.95.

Tim McDaniel, The Agony of the Russian Idea. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996, x + 201 pp. £24.95.

John Lowenhardt, The Reincarnation of Russia. Struggling with the Legacy of Communism, 1990–1994. Harlow: Longman, 1995, xii + 238 pp. £12.99.

Jeffrey W. Hahn (ed.), Democratization in Russia: The Development of Legislative Institutions. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996, 328 pp., $63.95 h/b, $24.95 p/b.

Celeste A. Wallander (ed.), The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War. Boulder Co: Westview, 1996, xi + 233 pp., £15.50.

David Cox, Retreating from the Cold War: Germany, Russia and the Withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces, London: Macmillan, 1996, xiv + 185 pp., £35.00.

Mark Webber, The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996, xvii + 366 pp. £14.99.

Michael Kraus & Ronald D. Liebowitz (eds), Russia and Eastern Europe after Communism: The Search for New Political, Economic and Security Systems. Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1996, xv+ 349 pp., £51.95.

Ivan T. Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 1944–1993: Detour from Periphery to Periphery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, xvii + 414 pp., £45.00.

Hubert Tworzecki, Parties and Politics in Post‐1989 Poland. Boulder, Co: Westview, 1996 xv + 219 pp.,

Jaroslav Krej?í & Pavel Machonin, Czechoslovakia 1918–92: A Laboratory for Social Change. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996, xviii + 266 pp., £42.50.

Jon Elster (ed.), The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1996, vi + 247 pp., £31.95.

J. Eatwell, M. Ellman, M. Nuti & J. Shapiro, Transformation and Integration: Shaping the Future of Central and Eastern Europe. London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1995, 206 pp.

D. Gross & A. Steinherr, Winds of Change—Economic Transition in Central and Western Europe. London: Longman, 1995.

Constantine Michalopoulos & David Tarr, Trade Performance and Policy in the New Independent States. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1996, vi + 30 pp.

Laurila Juhani, Finnish‐Soviet Clearing Trade and Payment System: History and Lessons. Helsinki: Bank of Finland, 1995, 144 pp.

Walter R. Iwaskiw (ed.), Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: Country Studies. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1996, xxxix + 304 pp.

Peter Unwin, Baltic Approaches. Wilby Hall, Norwich: Michael Russell, 1996, 256 pp., £19.50.

Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin: The Memoirs of Yegor Ligachev. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996, xxxix + 407 pp., £19.00.

Hillel Ticktin & Michael Cox (eds), The Ideas of Leon Trotsky. London: Porcupine Press, 1995, viii + 386 pp., £14.95.

Folke Dovring, Leninism: Political Economy as Pseudoscience, Westport,: Praeger, 1996, xi + 155 pp., £39.95.

Kevin Anderson, Lenin, Hegel, and Western Marxism: A Critical Study, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1995, xvii + 311 pp., $49.95 h/b, $15.95 p/b.

Ragnar E. Löfstedt & Gunnar Sjöstedt (eds), Environmental Aid Programmes to Eastern Europe, Aldershot: Avebury, 1996, ix+226 pp., £37.50.

Seabron Adamson, Robin Bates, Robert Laslett & Alberto Potoschnig, Energy Use, Air Pollution, and Environmental Policy in Krakow: Can Economic Incentives Really Help? Washington DC: The World Bank, 1996, 67 pp.

Alexander S. Preker & Richard G.A. Feachem, Market Mechanisms and the Health Sector in Central and Eastern Europe. Washington DC: The World Bank, 1995, 48 pp.

Adrian Room, Placenames of Russia and the Former Soviet Union. London: McFarland 1996, v + 282 pp., £52.65.

G. S. Smith, The Letters of D. S. Mirsky to P. P. Suvchinskii, 1922–31. Birmingham: Department of Russian Language and Literature, University of Birmingham, 1995, vii + 238 pp., £16.00

Nicholas Rzhevsky (ed.), An Anthology of Russian Literature from Earliest Writings to Modern Fiction: Introduction to a Culture. London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996, xiv + 587 pp.

Donald J. Raleigh (ed.), The Emperors and Empresses of Russia: Rediscovering the Romanovs. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996, xviii + 414 pp., $59.95 h/b, $23.95 p/b.

Maureen Perrie, Pretenders and Popular Monarchism in Early Modern Russia: The False Tsars of the Time of Troubles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, xvii + 269 pp. £40.00.     

Book reviews

Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm with Karl Erik Rosengren and Lennart Weibull, Return to the Western World. Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post‐communist Transition (Tartu University Press, Tartu, 1997), xvi +387 pp., ISBN 9985–56–257–7

Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (eds), The Revival of Right‐wing Extremism in the Nineties (Frank Cass, London, 1997), 289 pp., ISBN 0 7146 4676 8 (hb), 0 7146 4207 X (pb)

Arthur Lipow, Political Parties and Democracy (Pluto, London, 1996), 256 pp., ISBN 0 7453 1099 0 (hb), 0 7453 1098 2 (pb)

Gerald F. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), ix + 374 pp., ISBN 0–19–509439–5 (hb), 0–19–509440–9 (pb)

Mark T. Berger and Douglas A. Borer (eds), The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century (Routledge, London, 1997), 308 pp., ISBN 0–415–16167–3 (hb), 0–415–16168–1 (pb)

Paul Anderson and Nyta Mann, Safety First: The Making of New Labour (Granta, London, 1997), 456 pp., ISBN 1–86207–070–9     

Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management

Collaboration is a necessary foundation for dealing with both natural and technological hazards and disasters and the consequences of terrorism. This analysis describes the structure of the American emergency management system, the charts development of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and identifies conflicts arising from the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the attempt to impose a command and control system on a very collaborative organizational culture in a very collaborative sociopolitical and legal context. The importance of collaboration is stressed, and recommendations are offered on how to improve the amount and value of collaborative activities. New leadership strategies are recommended that derive their power from effective strategies and the transformational power of a compelling vision, rather than from hierarchy, rank, or standard operating procedures.     

Partisanship, Political Control, and Economic Assessments

Previous research shows that partisans rate the economy more favorably when their party holds power. There are several explanations for this association, including use of different evaluative criteria, selective perception, selective exposure to information, correlations between economic experiences and partisanship, and partisan bias in survey responses. We use a panel survey around the November 2006 election to measure changes in economic expectations and behavioral intentions after an unanticipated shift in political power. Using this design, we can observe whether the association between partisanship and economic assessments holds when some leading mechanisms thought to bring it about are excluded. We find that there are large and statistically significant partisan differences in how economic assessments and behavioral intentions are revised immediately following the Democratic takeover of Congress. We conclude that this pattern of partisan response suggests partisan differences in perceptions of the economic competence of the parties, rather than alternative mechanisms.     

Employment among Social Security disability program beneficiaries, 1996-2007

We use linked administrative data from program and earnings records to summarize the 2007 employment rates of Social Security disability program beneficiaries at the national and state levels, as well as changes in employment since 1996. The findings provide new information on the employment activities of beneficiaries that should be useful in assessing current agency policies and providing benchmarks for ongoing demonstration projects and future return-to-work initiatives. The overall employment rate--which we define as annual earnings over $1,000--was 12 percent in 2007. Substantial variation exists within the population. Disability Insurance beneficiaries and those younger than age 40 were much more likely to work relative to other Social Security beneficiaries. Additionally, substantial regional variation exists across states; employment rates ranged from 7 percent (West Virginia) to 23 percent (North Dakota). Moreover, we find that the employment rates among beneficiaries were sensitive to the business cycle and persistent over time.     

Political economy of crime and punishment under Stalin

Why do dictatorships favor harsher punishments than democracies? We use a rational choice approach to explain the stylized facts of Stalin’s dictatorship—preference for harsh sanctions, higher incarceration rates, greater use of capital punishment, low tolerance for theft of state property and workplace violations. They are shown to be explained by the preferences of a rational dictator, who does not internalize the social and private cost of punishment.