全文获取类型
收费全文 | 643篇 |
免费 | 35篇 |
专业分类
各国政治 | 36篇 |
工人农民 | 38篇 |
世界政治 | 65篇 |
外交国际关系 | 26篇 |
法律 | 286篇 |
中国政治 | 32篇 |
政治理论 | 189篇 |
综合类 | 6篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 3篇 |
2022年 | 5篇 |
2021年 | 19篇 |
2020年 | 21篇 |
2019年 | 14篇 |
2018年 | 23篇 |
2017年 | 30篇 |
2016年 | 16篇 |
2015年 | 21篇 |
2014年 | 19篇 |
2013年 | 99篇 |
2012年 | 29篇 |
2011年 | 13篇 |
2010年 | 12篇 |
2009年 | 21篇 |
2008年 | 15篇 |
2007年 | 29篇 |
2006年 | 19篇 |
2005年 | 22篇 |
2004年 | 21篇 |
2003年 | 17篇 |
2002年 | 26篇 |
2001年 | 10篇 |
2000年 | 11篇 |
1999年 | 10篇 |
1998年 | 4篇 |
1997年 | 9篇 |
1996年 | 3篇 |
1995年 | 9篇 |
1994年 | 15篇 |
1993年 | 5篇 |
1992年 | 12篇 |
1991年 | 9篇 |
1990年 | 5篇 |
1989年 | 10篇 |
1988年 | 6篇 |
1987年 | 7篇 |
1986年 | 6篇 |
1985年 | 9篇 |
1984年 | 2篇 |
1983年 | 6篇 |
1982年 | 5篇 |
1981年 | 2篇 |
1980年 | 4篇 |
1979年 | 2篇 |
1978年 | 5篇 |
1977年 | 3篇 |
1975年 | 4篇 |
1974年 | 6篇 |
1973年 | 3篇 |
排序方式: 共有678条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
21.
Why do dictatorships favor harsher punishments than democracies? We use a rational choice approach to explain the stylized facts of Stalin’s dictatorship—preference for harsh sanctions, higher incarceration rates, greater use of capital punishment, low tolerance for theft of state property and workplace violations. They are shown to be explained by the preferences of a rational dictator, who does not internalize the social and private cost of punishment. 相似文献
22.
23.
24.
Gregory Melleuish 《澳大利亚政治与历史杂志》2012,58(1):112-122
This essay examines the model of state development put forward by Francis Fukuyama in his book, The Origins of Political Order. It argues that the evolutionary model used by Fukuyama experiences problems when it comes to dealing with specific historical examples. Its emphasis on the Qin state as the “first modern state” places an excessive emphasis on coercion and violence as the basis of the state. It attempts to relegate Rome to being equivalent to a chiefdom to fit it into his model whereas in reality Rome evolved differently to China and relied much more on cooperation and networks. England after 1688 provides another example of how Fukuyama's model is deficient. On this basis the paper argues that a universal evolutionary model is insufficient to explain political development and it is more appropriate to begin analysis with real political societies. 相似文献
25.
26.
27.
28.
Matthew J. Lebo Adam J. McGlynn Gregory Koger 《American journal of political science》2007,51(3):464-481
Why does the influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time? Building on prevailing answers, we develop a model, Strategic Party Government, which highlights the electoral motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between parties. We test this theory using the entire range of House and Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic behavior of parties complements members' preferences as an explanation for variation in party influence. Specifically, the strongest predictors of one party's voting unity are the unity of the opposing party and the difference between the parties in the preceding year. Moreover, we find strong links between party behavior in Congress and electoral outcomes: an increase in partisan influence on legislative voting has adverse electoral costs, while winning contested votes has electoral benefits. 相似文献
29.
30.
In Virginia, major differences between revenue forecasts and actual revenue collections raised questions from legislators about the adequacy of the state's econometric forecasting models and the forecasting process itself. Consequently, Virginia's process and models were examined by the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC), a legislative watchdog agency. The review found most of the differences could be attributed to declining economic factors and not poor forecasting. However, a surprisingly large component of the forecast was based on undocumented judgmental inputs that required greater oversight. Other states in similar circumstances may wish to evaluate their own forecasting process and econometric models using the JLARC approach. 相似文献