Swedish Bureaucracy in an Era of Change

Swedish bureaucracy combines some structural peculiarities founded on constitutional traits from the 17^th century with a clear formal division of labor between the national and local levels from the late 19^th century. These structures have mainly remained unchanged during periods of strong expansion in the first post-WWII decades and preconditions for shrinking during the 1980s and 1990s. In this article, we highlight how these changes have put stress on the bureaucracy and the public sector in general, and how demands for reform and adapting have been managed and viewed by the administrative and political camps, respectively. Social, educational, and political changes among Swedish bureaucrats and their roles are presented and analyzed. The national bureaucracy has "muddled through" and has not been subjected to radical reforms. Its working is still approved—though by no means regarded as sacred—by its administrative agents and its political principals.     

The ecological context of interpersonal violence: from culture to collective efficacy

This brief essay outlines the progression over the last 20 years of ecological theories of interpersonal violence. The period between the present and the early 1980s began with a revival of cultural explanations of violence that paralleled the introduction of the neo-conservative social science and then witnessed a rediscovery of deficits based structural explanations of interpersonal violence under the broad rubric of social disorganization theory. The essay concludes with a more optimistic appraisal of recent refinements of social disorganization theory that consider the mediating effects of collective efficacy on urban crime and interpersonal violence.     

Power,Interests and Coalitions: the political economy of mass privatisation in Turkey

This article argues that ethnicity has become increasingly salient in Afghan politics and society during the years of war, and discusses how the country's new institutions can be designed in a way that will contribute towards a reversal of this trend. The article examines a series of policy issues with a bearing on inclusion vs exclusion in inter‐ethnic relations: political institution building (institutions of government, electoral system, and centre–region relations), land rights, state religion, the census and the new identity document. For each of these the article discusses what outcome would best contribute to longer‐term stability and integration by stimulating inclusive, integrative identities—and what the problems and prospects are for these outcomes to be realised. The article specifically discusses warlords' role as spoilers, and the potential and limitations to the leverage on Afghan politics that is held by international actors, above all the USA.     

Leaving Security in Safe Hands: identity,legitimacy and cohesion in the new Afghan and Iraqi armies

Built by outside powers and targeted against local insurgents, the new national armies of Afghanistan and Iraq are fragile institutions. The legitimacy of these forces is limited in the deeply divided societies in which they exist. Whereas low levels of legitimacy exert a disintegrative pressure upon an army, cohesion counterweighs such pressure. This article engages the theory of military unit cohesion for the purpose of increasing understanding of the challenges to cohesion faced by the new armies of Afghanistan and Iraq. Two main sources of legitimacy for the new armies are discussed: the (ethnic/sectarian) composition of the forces, and their respective missions. Challenges to cohesion are found to depend on how soldiers are recruited and units composed: ethnically/sectarian mixed units may disintegrate because of weak horizontal cohesion; homogeneous units (particularly when recruited as groups and not individually) may splinter off because of weak vertical cohesion. The article also argues that promoting an image of the army as ‘national’ within a society may reduce disintegrative pressures.     

Making words count: Coalition agreements and cabinet management

The cabinet is a central actor in policy making in parliamentary systems. Yet, relatively little is known about how coalition cabinets operate. The delegation of decision‐making authority to ministers invites policy drift, which threatens the cohesiveness of the cabinet's policy programme. Cabinets employ a variety of methods to contain policy drift. The writing of coalition agreements is among the major tools, but there are others, including limiting ministerial autonomy and the use of junior ministers to shadow ministers. The present study demonstrates that coalition agreements are written to contain policy drift and that it is directly related to the degree of hierarchy in the cabinet. It studies the factors that affect the likelihood of a coalition agreement being written and how extensive they are, if written. Among these are the ideological diversity found in the cabinet, the use of alternative methods for controlling ministers and the complexity of the bargaining situation.     

The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court,the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz: A Conflict between Right and Right in Which There is No Praetor1

The ECJ has long asserted its Kompetenz‐Kompetenz (the question of who has the authority to decide where the borders of EU authority end) based on the Union treaties which have always defined its role as the final interpreter of EU law. Yet, no national constitutional court has accepted this position, and in its Lisbon Judgment of 2009 the German Constitutional Court (FCC) has asserted its own jurisdiction of the final resort' to review future EU treaty changes and transfers of powers to the EU on two grounds: (i) ultra vires review, and (ii) identity review. The FCC justifies its claim to constitutional review with reference to its role as guardian of the national constitution whose requirements will constrain the integration process as a standing proviso and limitation on all transfers of national power to the EU for as long as the EU has not acquired the indispensable core of sovereignty, i.e. autochthonous law‐making under its own sovereign powers and constitution, and instead continues to derive its own power from the Member States under the principle of conferral. Formally therefore, at least until such time, the problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz affords of no solution. It can only be ‘managed’, which requires the mutual forbearance of both the ECJ and FCC which both claim the ultimate jurisdiction to decide the limits of the EU's powers—a prerogative which, if asserted by both parties without political sensitivity, would inevitably result in a constitutional crisis. The fact that no such crisis has occurred, illustrates the astute political acumen of both the FCC and the ECJ.