“The past,present, and the perhaps’ is Germany a “normal” power?

Thomas Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Christian Hacke, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Weltmacht wider Willen? 3rd ed. (Berlin: Ullstein, 1997).

Peter Katzenstein, ed., Tamed Power: Germany in Europe. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich, The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

Elizabeth Pond, The Rebirth of Europe. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999).

James Sperling, “Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in Post‐Cold War Europe,” British Journal of Political Science (forthcoming).     

Managing Military Transformations: Agency,Culture, and the U.S. Carrier Revolution

The marketplace of ideas within a mature democracy such as the United States is supposed to fairly reliably vet foreign policies through open, wide-ranging debate. It is widely recognized that the U.S. marketplace of ideas failed during the 2002-03 debate over going to war in Iraq. Examinations of this market failure have emphasized executive powers and public fear after 9/11 as the main reasons threat inflation succeeded; I show neither explains this case. The majority opposition was silenced throughout early 2002 and ultimately defeated in a struggle over the Iraq War Resolution by pressures to be patriotic. I contend that this silencing patriotism should not be considered ordinary patriotism for a democracy as it is anti-democratic. I discuss how two critical norms of behavior which silence debate of national security policies and cause deference to the executive branch on war powers became established as part of the militarized political culture that took root in the United States during the Cold War. Thus these norms, enforced by what I term to be militarized patriotism left over from the Cold War, silenced debate over Iraq and led to the failure of the marketplace of ideas.     

Interests over norms in western policy towards the Caucasus: How Abkhazia is no one's Kosovo

The potentially numerous cases of ‘genocide’ around the world can now invoke the precedent of NATO's use of military force for humanitarian purposes against Serbia in spring 1999. Such a claim was suggested by Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze over Georgia's disputed former autonomous republic of Abkhazia. The conflict over this former ‘Soviet Riviera’ again demonstrates the constraints behind gaining accurate information on the causes and consequences of a conflict. Particularly, it illustrates the difficulty of determining what constitutes ‘genocide’ and against whom, as both the Abkhaz and the displaced Georgians make such claims. On that basis, each party can expect ‐ and equally fear ‐ a NATO‐style military intervention. In the event, even if both sides view themselves as victims of ‘genocide’ and entitled to such intervention, Western perceptions of strategic interests in the Caucasus prevent this scenario. The determination of injustices, quite apart from their redress, goes unanswered.     

Executing priority national development in indonesia: Program innovation of the junior minister

In the process of Indonesia's administrative reform and conduct of its planned development efforts, several innovative measures evolved in its executive structure. One of these was the use of temporary organizational entities to expedite the achievement of development goals where sectors/programs of the national development plan encompass two or more executive agencies and/or levels of governments. In organizational design, the executive problem is the reconciliation between responsibility and authority with the purpose of achieving maximum technical efficiency in the execution of priority development programs. As an organizational device to deal with this problem, the offices of six junior ministers were established. By employing the technique of executive authority in rank, these ministers, heading temporary agencies organized in terms of program responsibility as specified in the development plan and as approved by the cabinet, have become the organizational means by which to integrate all of the disparate project activities vested in the executive line agencies in productive organizational cores. Should this organizational innovation prove successful, it will be one of the more important organizational contributions in recent years to the execution of centrally planned development programs in a developing society.     

Anti-Immigrant Parties,Local Presence and Electoral Success

Abstract

Does the local organisational presence of anti-immigrant parties affect their chances for electoral success? In order to answer this question, the article explores the potential of a supply-oriented explanation to anti-immigrant party success by examining the electoral advancements the Sweden Democrats (SD) made in the 2006 and 2010 elections. Our results indicate that traditional demand-side explanations to anti-immigrant party success can be successfully complemented by an ‘internal supply-side argument’ to make the electoral fates of these parties more intelligible. Whether the SD had a local organisational presence had a substantial effect on its results in the national election and on the probability of gaining representation in local councils. Thus, the party’s fate in the national as well as local elections was largely determined by whether or not it had a local organisational presence in Swedish municipalities.     

The layfield report: Constitutional implications

Control and Power in Central‐Local Government Relations, R. A. W. Rhodes, Gower, 1981, pp. 194, £11.50.

Power, Property and Corporatism: The Political Sociology of Planning, James Simmie, Macmillan, 1981, pp. 348, £15.00 hardback, £6.95 paperback.

Policy and Politics in Britain: The Limits of Consensus, Douglas E. Ashford, Basil Blackwell, 1981, pp. 330, £12.00 hardback, £4.95 paperback.

Local Government in Britain, Tony Byrne, Penguin Books, 1981, pp. 347, £2.95.

International Handbook on Local Government Reorganization, Edited by Donald C. Rowat, Aldwych Press, 1980, pp.626, £27.50.     

Professional credentialing of american municipal managers: Searchings for national and cross-national experiences

Over the last several decades, American managers have not performed well. Municipal managers are no exception. Although considerable attention has been given to the need of strengthening upper levels of municipal management, the results have been disappointing. Too often these positions are filled by rank amateurs. The nation can no longer afford the cost of amateur managers.

Professional credentialing is proposed as a basic way to correct the situation. The discussion searches national and cross-national experiences in credentialing. It singles out Irish, Australian and American public school experiences as to possible developmental programs in this vital area.     

Multiple Indicators of financial instability in local governments

This paper suggests methods to ascertain the fiscal health of local governments. The methods can be applied to total, short-term, or long-term indebtedness and are conducive to market or regulatory management approaches. Essentially, we argue against the use of single indicators of financial health applied in an absolute manner and for the comparative use of multiple indicators through time. Tracking multiple indicators through time affords administrators, regulators, investors and citizens a better picture of the financial situation of a locale in comparison to other similar locales at any point in time as well as a clearer indication of potentially troublesome trends. The paper concludes with an illustration of the multiple indicators method applied to the total and GOB indebtedness of a sample of 161 Florida cities and towns. The illustration includes a suggested threshold level and finds less than 10 percent of Florida cities and towns above this limit.

The paper concludes with an illustration of the multiple indicators method applied to the total and GOB indebtedness of a sample of 161 Florida cities and towns. The illustration includes a suggested threshold level and finds less than 10 percent of Florida cities and towns above this limit.     

If You Want a Middle Class Keep Your Industrial Base

The future of the European Union has never been more in doubt than at the very moment it has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its historical accomplishments. When the heads of Europe's weakest institutions—the Commission, the Council and the Parliament—collected the prize in Oslo on December 10, 2012 they spotlighted the nub of the problem. Unless these institutions can garner the legitimacy of European citizens and transform into a real federal union with common fiscal and economic policies to complement the single currency, Europe will remain at the mercy of global financial markets and the fiscally authoritarian dictates of its strongest state, Germany. Moving beyond this state of affairs was the focus of a recent “town hall” gathering in Berlin sponsored by the Berggruen Institute on Governance. The meeting brought together current power brokers—such as the contending voices of German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble and French Finance Minister Pierre Moscovici, who rarely appear in public together—as well as Europe's top former leaders, key thinkers and young people who will govern in the future. The peace‐building project of the European Union was born out of the ashes of World War II and the anguish of the Cold War. Yet, as George Soros points out, its current inability to resolve the eurocrisis by forging greater union is dividing Europe once again, this time between creditors and debtors. Former Greek premier George Papandreou has warned that this division is fomenting a new politics of fear that is giving rise to the same kind of xenophobic movements that fueled the extreme politics of the Nazi era. To avoid a repeat of the last calamitous century, Europe first of all needs a growth strategy both to escape the “debt trap” it is in—and which austerity alone will only deepen—and to create breathing space for the tough structural reforms that can make Europe as a whole competitive again in a globalized world. To sustain reform, it needs a clear path to legitimacy for the institutions that must govern a federal Europe. The proof that Europe can escape its crisis through a combination of growth, fiscal discipline and structural reform comes from the one country so many want to keep out of the union: Turkey. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan rightfully boasts of Turkey's accomplishments that resulted from the difficult changes carried out after its crisis in 2001—ranging from quickly cleaning up the banks to liberalizing markets to trimming social benefits to make them more affordable in the long run. As a result, Turkey today is the fastest growing economy in the world alongside China with diminished deficit and debt levels that meet the eurozone criteria that many members states themselves cannot today meet. Turkey has even offered a 5 billion euro credit through the IMF for financial aid to Europe. Germany itself also provides some lessons for the rest of Europe. The obvious reason Germany rules today is because it is the most globally competitive country in the European Union. That is the result of a series of reforms that were implemented starting in 2003 under the leadership of then‐chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Aimed a bolstering Germany's industrial base and its collateral small and medium enterprises which are the foundation of its middle class society, those reforms introduced more labor flexibility and trimmed benefits to make them sustainably affordable while investing in training, maintaining skills and research and development. Even if Europe's individual nation states can shrink imbalances by following Turkey and Germany in getting their act together, the only ultimate way to save the euro, and thus Europe itself, is to build the complementary governing institutions at the European level. For those institutions to become effective, they must be empowered and legitimated by European citizens themselves. To this end, Tony Blair has suggested a bold move: the direct election of a European president. Symbolically, the Oslo ceremonies were a historical turning point for Europe. By recognizing the European Union's peace‐making past, the Nobel Prize challenged Europe to escape once and for all the destructive pull of narrow national interests and passions.