Psychopathy and Mortality

It is not known how mortality differs between psychopathic and nonpsychopathic individuals. We linked data from subjects having been in forensic mental examinations at Niuvanniemi Hospital during 1984–1993 to the data from the National Death Registry to estimate the association between psychopathy and mortality. One hundred psychopathic individuals scoring 25 or higher in the PCL‐R scale were followed up for 20–30 years. Two control groups were used as follows: 178 offenders scoring less than 25 on the PCL‐R, and sample of general population drawn from the Finnish National Statistics database. Results reveal that psychopaths die younger than the general population, and the causes of death are more violent than in the nonpsychopath control group. There was a significant positive correlation between PCL‐R score and mortality, and the mortality among psychopaths was about fivefold when compared with general population.     

An assessment of voting system simulations

In applying the results of the social choice theory to voting procedures, the question arises as to how often the various anomalies can be expected to occur. Computer simulations and probability modelling are common approaches to address this problem. This article is an attempt to find out the robustness of the so-called impartial culture assumption. For this purpose first a major perturbation of the impartial culture assumption is considered and, thereafter, we focus on a few minor modifications of the assumption.     

A priori power measures and the institutions of the European Union

Abstract. The a priori voting powers of member countries in the council of ministers of the European Union have been discussed in the literature mainly from the view–point of Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik indices. This paper discusses — in the light of these and other more recent (Colomer's, Holler's as well as Deegan and Packel's) power indices — the interaction of the council ministers and the European Parliament (EP) under the assumption that the consent of both bodies is needed to carry a motion or piece of union–wide legislation. Moreover, the double–majority principle is discussed from the view–point of voting power distribution. Finally we consider the voting power distribution in a three–chamber system consisting of Commission, Council and EP.     

On Riker's Theory of Political Succession

Riker's view of the dynamical forces of political systems singles out disequilibrium, strategic voting and agenda-manipulation as the pervasive features determining the nature of political change. We shall investigate these characteristics in some detail and thereafter evaluate the methodological aspects of Riker's theory. Some observations on the general relevance of the equilibrium analysis of multi-dimensional spatial voting models for the study of political institutions are also made.