Security threats and institutional response. The European context

This paper will explore the perceptions of security threats (identification of types and likelihood of occurrence) and institutional response (degree of institutional suitability according to type of threat) that prevails in the European context. It will compare how the main security institutions (NATO, EU and OSCE) respond to different type of security threats. This will be done through the aid of a number of security governance functions (conflict prevention, peace-enforcement, peace-keeping and peace-building). A main objective of the paper will be to examine which of the three is deemed most relevant in dealing with specific types of threats.     

General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior*

This research addresses the assumption that “general deterrence” is an important key to enhanced compliance with regulatory laws. Through a survey of 233 firms in several industries in the United States, we sought to answer the following questions: (1) When severe legal penalties are imposed against a violator of environmental laws, do other companies in the same industry actually learn about such “signal cases”? (2) Does knowing about “signal cases” change firms’ compliance‐related behavior? It was found that only 42 percent of respondents could identify the “signal case,” but 89 percent could identify some enforcement actions against other firms, and 63 percent of firms reported having taken some compliance‐related actions in response to learning about such cases. Overall, it is concluded that because most firms are in compliance already (for a variety of other reasons), this form of “explicit general deterrence” knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance routines.     

Error minimization and deterrence in agency control

In the presented oversight model, in which a regulatory agency may collude with regulatees, a watchdog organization may scrutinize the agency’s decision-making and find evidence speaking for collusive behavior. Found evidence is of a specific, stochastic quality. Courts will overturn the administrative decision when the evidence presented in court exceeds a minimum quality standard set by the political principal. Lowering the quality standard increases the odds of finding evidence of sufficient quality and, hence, leads to increasing collusion deterrence and to a lower probability of acquitting collusive administrators (type I error), but also to a higher probability of convicting an innocent administrator (type II error). It is shown that, when welfare-maximization gives rise to an interior solution, the welfare-maximizing standard of evidence is lower than the one that merely minimizes the costs of legal errors without taking deterrence costs into account, but will imply incomplete deterrence. However, conditions can and will be identified under which both error cost minimization and complete deterrence coincide with welfare-maximization.     

Teenage suicide in King County, Washington. I. Rates of suicide for 26 years

The population-adjusted rate of teenage suicide in King County, Washington, was reviewed for the 26 years from 1959 to 1984. For the entire period, the rate did not change significantly. An abrupt change did occur during the middle of this period, but, for reasons discussed in the text, this may well represent a change in procedures and philosophy of death certification rather than a real change in rate. Reasons for the apparent discrepancy with national statistics are discussed.     

The Dutch Engagement with the Project of International Criminal Justice

Netherlands International Law Review -