Non-Discriminatory,Envy Free Provision of a Collective Good: A Note

In a setting in which the provision of acollective good is at stake the ``principleof generality as equal treatment'' isrelated to the concept of ``envy free nettrades''. This leads to an operationalformulation of the fundamental liberal aimof non-discriminatory politics in terms ofstated preferences or bids. Starting fromsuch bids a simple axiomatic justificationfor ``schematically equal taxes'' (everyonepays the same amount) is given.     

"Geeignete Maßnahme zum Schutz des Verbrauchers" bei nicht (hinreichend) erfolgter Belehrung über Widerrufsrecht beim Haustürgeschäft

Art 4 Haustürgesch?fte-RL verwehrt es einem nationalen Gericht nicht, von Amts wegen die Nichtigkeit eines Vertrags, der in den Anwendungsbereich dieser RL f?llt, aus dem Grund festzustellen, dass der Verbraucher nicht über sein Widerrufsrecht belehrt wurde, obwohl der Verbraucher die Nichtigkeit vor den zust?ndigen nationalen Gerichten zu keinem Zeitpunkt geltend gemacht hat.     

Information sharing,secrecy and trust among law enforcement and secret service institutions in the European Union

Abstract

Transnational information sharing among security agencies in the European Union and beyond has grown considerably more important over the past decades. Centralised databases and numerous formal and informal networks now facilitate cooperation and information sharing. However, sharing intelligence may not only conflict with the protection of fundamental rights (data protection/privacy; presumption of innocence), but also with the organisational culture of institutions that are built upon secrecy. Police agencies often keep knowledge about individual cases and their strategies secret as long as possible. Intelligence services build their work and strategies upon secrecy even more. This paper analyses the variations of secrecy that can be observed for police agencies and secret services, and the relationship between information sharing among security agencies, secrecy, trust, transparency and accountability. In a normative perspective, the paper explores answers to the questions of how secret the work of security agencies should be in democratic rule of law systems and how accountability can be improved without making these institutions work less effectively.     

Public commitment strategies in intergovernmental negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty

We analyze the impact of public commitment strategies as bargaining tools in the negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty using a sequential-bargaining model with incomplete information. The analysis suggests selection bias in observable public commitments with respect to the kind of issues that are publicly challenged as well as the kind of governments that will ‘go public’. Public commitments are more likely under high uncertainty over audience costs. Further, the effect of public commitments on the duration and outcome of negotiation is conditional as well. In our empirical analysis, where we analyze the intergovernmental stage of the negotiations on the European Constitutional Treaty, we find strong empirical support for each of our theoretical predictions. Governments were most likely to commit publicly if they represented a domestic constituency that was negative about the EU Constitution and, at the same time, contained many undecided respondents. Moreover, these public commitments were generally quickly accommodated. In contrast, public commitments were less likely to lead to any changes if they were made by governments representing a domestic constituency that was relatively positive about the draft Constitution or negative and decided. In the latter case, however, public statements made bargaining deadlock more likely.