Besprechungen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Die sozialen Konsequenzen der Restitution von Grundeigentum in Deutschland und Polen

Der Artikel vergleicht die Restitution von Immobilieneigentum in Polen und Deutschland. In Polen gibt es bisher keine gesetzliche Regelung, aber über Verwaltungsentscheidungen wird dennoch Privateigentum restituiert; in Deutschland ist der Restitutionsprozess weitgehend abgeschlossen. Die Analyse geht der Frage nach, ob die moralisch und funktional begründete Privatisierung ihre vorgegebenen Ziele erreicht hat. Die Privatisierung von Häusern und Grundstücken greift in einen sensiblen, mit persönlichen Emotionen verquickten Bereich der Sozialordnung ein, so dass die doppelte Zielsetzung der Restitution, sowohl historische Gerechtigkeit als auch kapitalistische Marktverhältnisse herzustellen, besonderen Schwierigkeiten begegnet. Die Analyse der sozialen und ökonomischen Konsequenzen der sehr unterschiedlich gestalteten Prozesse zeigt, dass in beiden Gesellschaften das anspruchsvolle Ziel einer Herstellung historischer Gerechtigkeit nicht ohne die Entstehung neuer sozialer Ungleichheiten und Ungerechtigkeiten umgesetzt werden konnte. An den Beispielen Prenzlauer Berg und Kleinmachnow in der Region Berlin werden große Unterschiede in der Akzeptanz der Rückgabe durch die Betroffenen deutlich.     

The Speed of Global Flows and the Pace of Democratic Politics

The claim I want to make in this article is, in short, first, that democratic theory for the most part has seriously neglected the temporal preconditions of liberal democracy and, second, that it therefore fails to adequately grasp some fundamental aspects of the crisis of democratic self-determination in the contemporary global age. In its first part, the article seeks to demonstrate that the history of modernity is an ongoing process of social acceleration and that most of the phenomena we currently grasp under the concept of “globalization” can in fact best be understood as instances or consequences of the latest wave of social acceleration. In the second and main part of this article, the consequences of this acceleratory character of modernity for the plausibility, legitimacy and possibility of political democracy are systematically explored. The main argument is that the speed-up of society at first enabled and supported democratization, but beyond a certain critical threshold, the reverse effect occurs: the speed of social change and the dynamics of socioeconomic development threaten to undermine the proper functioning of democracy. Thus, it is my claim that democracy only works properly within a certain time- or “speed-frame” of social change. From this, I conclude that what is called for in the Age of Globalization is a new critical theory of acceleration, the contours of which I briefly sketch out in the third and last part of this essay.     

Non-Discriminatory,Envy Free Provision of a Collective Good: A Note

In a setting in which the provision of acollective good is at stake the ``principleof generality as equal treatment'' isrelated to the concept of ``envy free nettrades''. This leads to an operationalformulation of the fundamental liberal aimof non-discriminatory politics in terms ofstated preferences or bids. Starting fromsuch bids a simple axiomatic justificationfor ``schematically equal taxes'' (everyonepays the same amount) is given.     

Public commitment strategies in intergovernmental negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty

We analyze the impact of public commitment strategies as bargaining tools in the negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty using a sequential-bargaining model with incomplete information. The analysis suggests selection bias in observable public commitments with respect to the kind of issues that are publicly challenged as well as the kind of governments that will ‘go public’. Public commitments are more likely under high uncertainty over audience costs. Further, the effect of public commitments on the duration and outcome of negotiation is conditional as well. In our empirical analysis, where we analyze the intergovernmental stage of the negotiations on the European Constitutional Treaty, we find strong empirical support for each of our theoretical predictions. Governments were most likely to commit publicly if they represented a domestic constituency that was negative about the EU Constitution and, at the same time, contained many undecided respondents. Moreover, these public commitments were generally quickly accommodated. In contrast, public commitments were less likely to lead to any changes if they were made by governments representing a domestic constituency that was relatively positive about the draft Constitution or negative and decided. In the latter case, however, public statements made bargaining deadlock more likely.

Information sharing,secrecy and trust among law enforcement and secret service institutions in the European Union

Abstract

Transnational information sharing among security agencies in the European Union and beyond has grown considerably more important over the past decades. Centralised databases and numerous formal and informal networks now facilitate cooperation and information sharing. However, sharing intelligence may not only conflict with the protection of fundamental rights (data protection/privacy; presumption of innocence), but also with the organisational culture of institutions that are built upon secrecy. Police agencies often keep knowledge about individual cases and their strategies secret as long as possible. Intelligence services build their work and strategies upon secrecy even more. This paper analyses the variations of secrecy that can be observed for police agencies and secret services, and the relationship between information sharing among security agencies, secrecy, trust, transparency and accountability. In a normative perspective, the paper explores answers to the questions of how secret the work of security agencies should be in democratic rule of law systems and how accountability can be improved without making these institutions work less effectively.