North Korea: The Case for Strategic Entanglement

North Korea is a state shrouded in secrecy, yet it receives an enormous amount of media attention. Its reclusive nature makes analysis difficult and speculative. What is certain is that a dangerous stalemate regarding nuclear weapons has persisted for far too long and is an obstacle to any real change in the political system. History, culture, and ideology all rule the state's actions; it is therefore a mistake to assume North Korean negotiators can act with autonomy. A new and dynamic means to deal with this dilemma should be developed, for the past has demonstrated that threats and demands will not coerce Pyongyang into submitting, in fact, that approach will only exacerbate the problem. An effective means to move beyond the stalemate is needed.     

Secession crises,human welfare and conflict resolution

Violent and persistent inter-group conflict often results from antagonisms that arise between minority groups and central governments over the oppressive treatment of the minority group and over efforts by the minority group to secede from the parent state. The legal principles that have guided international involvement in these secession crises, namely self-determination of peoples and territorial integrity of the state, have not been effective or consistent inducements for resolution or prevention of the outbreak of conflict. This paper considers how international recognition of secessionist claims could be made dependent on whether the relevant minority group or central government lays out the most convincing plans for enhancing the welfare of the population, avoiding exclusionary policies, and promoting inter-group cooperation and stability rather than inter-group conflict and disorder. The authors urge policy makers to develop judgment criteria that reflect knowledge of these concerns to induce conditions more favourable for stability and peace.     

Justice Presumed and Assistance Denied: The Yugoslav Tribunal as Obstruction to Economic Recovery

The value of the ICTY for stabilizing the Balkans is rarely questioned, but the Tribunal is unpopular with the majority of people there. More international funding is spent on the Tribunal than on improving health and other services in Bosnia, while “conditionality” based on cooperation with the Tribunal impedes the economic and democratic development of the region. Can a court that tries to keep the memory of massacres fresh for 20 years, that is overwhelmingly mistrusted by the very people to whom it claims to bring justice, and that has called for economic sanctions on a devastated region, really be a force for reconciliation and the building of stable political relations in the Balkans?