Valuations – or How to Say the Unsayable

In this paper, the author revisits "the emotive theory of value" and argues that values are not entities but nothing other than "linguistic fictions". Accordingly, valuations—i.e., valuing actions—can be defined as approving or disapproving attitudes of a subject to some object. In this perspective, values cannot be true or false: What we can do is just compare them with regard to strength. As a consequence, value judgments are to be understood as sentences which are used either to say that a subject s values an object o positively or negatively, or to express (evince) a valuation. The author then shows some relations between normative and evaluative discourses. First, he claims that norms as well as valuations are not true or false. Second, he argues that both may be explained or justified, even if the former are usually justified teleologically whereas the latter are explained referring back to the subject's background and life-style. Third, he notes that a legal order originates from the fact that valuations "crystallize" into norms. Finally, the author examines some further questions related to his analysis. In particular, he argues that the different realms of values, e.g., morals, aesthetics, politics, etc., do not correspond to different evaluative attitudes, but to different phenomena and diverse spheres of human life.     

The role of donors: how to combine sector programme support with devolution? A comment from a practitioner to James Wunsch: ‘decentralization,local governance and “recentralization” in Africa’

In commenting on ‘Decentralization, Local Governance and ‘Recentralization’ in Africa’ (Wunsch, 2001 ), this article concurs with the general thesis of Wunsch that the actual implementation as distinct from the rhetoric of decentralization in Africa has featured lingering central retention of power and resources and that genuine local control over important services and investments remains elusive. However, there is evidence that this is not invariably the case and that donors may have decisive roles to play in encouraging local assertiveness in the medium term in providing leverage for change through budget support and technical assistance to civic education, training local councillors, monitoring local government elections and encouraging local government associations to put to the test the national commitment to genuine local governance. These roles include helping to ensure the transparency of central transfers and, as in Uganda and Malawi for example, assisting with the development of intermediary fiscal mechanisms in this regard. Learning from such promising experiences will be vital in nurturing the longer term optimism heralded by Wunsch. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mapping giant honey bee nests in Palawan,Philippines through a transdisciplinary approach

This article reports on a study that uses participatory mapping with indigenous Tagbanua honey hunters and gatherers to understand the spatial distribution of giant honey bees in a community forest in Palawan, Philippines. Through the use of global positioning system devices, digital cameras, and a solar home system as an electricity source, local collaborators mapped 31 bee nests from April to June 2015. This study provides a replicable long-term participatory methodology and promotes participatory learning and mutual knowledge creation. By combining applied sustainability research with local stakeholder participation, the article suggests that novel knowledge and solutions can aid sustainable rural development.     

Flexibility and uncertainty in the housing market

This paper provides one reason why the level of trading in the housing market is volatile. We show that when uncertainty is high and can be expected to be resolved in the near future, both buyers and sellers have an incentive to postpone trading until uncertainty has been resolved. In the model, agents trade in the housing market either now, when there is uncertainty concerning the future tax rule for house owners, or later, when this uncertainty has been resolved. Under the assumption of risk neutrality (and high transaction costs), we show that any rational expectations equilibrium involves all trading being postponed. When agents are risk averse, this result holds less generally; we show that it does hold when changes in the tax rule are expected not to affect the future price of houses too strongly.