Conflicts of preferences and domestic constraints: understanding reform failure in liberal state-building and democracy promotion

This paper challenges the common explanations that failures of external state-building and democracy promotion are the result of a lack of domestic capacity or a lack of domestic willingness against an externally set liberal agenda of state-building and democratisation. Studying political decision-making on a micro-level, we argue that both explanations fail to capture the multi-faceted motivations and interests of domestic actors that go beyond mere ‘resistance’ against externally induced liberal reforms. Rather, criticism of reforms might be rooted in ideas of social justice and claims to socio-economic security. Furthermore, these explanations tend to overlook the need for domestic elites to bargain with various domestic stakeholders. A case study of Croatian public administration reform illustrates that failure of externally promoted reforms remain an option when significant international resources are available for liberal state-building and the target of reform is a relatively mature bureaucracy.     

The influence of direct democracy on the shadow economy

We analyze, both theoretically and empirically, the influence of direct democratic institutions on the size and development of shadow economies. Our model suggests that, as the extent of direct democracy increases, implemented fiscal policies more nearly reflect the preferences of citizens and so reduce their incentives to operate in the informal sector. This theory implies a negative relationship between the extent of direct democracy and the size of the country’s shadow economy. We also theorize that direct democracy has a greater effect in reducing the informal sector when the former is at low or intermediate values and when the electoral system is characterized by a larger district magnitude. An empirical investigation of a sample of 57 democracies confirms our model’s predictions.     

Economic Consequences of Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football

We discuss the effects of three different transfer fee systems in European football on contract lengths, wages, profits, education incentives and the number of talents being educated. The different regimes, being used until the Bosman judgement of 1995, currently in use, and recently proposed by the European Commission differ with respect to the transfer fee an initial club must accept in case of a transfer depending on whether a player has a valid contract or not. In particular, we argue that due to its averse effects on investment incentives, the Commission should refrain from its Suggestion of abolishing freely negotiable transfer fees. Our analysis also sheds some light on the issue under which circumstances binding long-term contracts should be allowed in general labor law.     

Einheit-in-Verschiedenheit

Der Beitrag setzt sich kritisch mit der Debatte um Integration in der deutschen Migrationsforschung auseinander. In Deutschland dominiert eine assimilative Integrationstheorie: Integration sei nur als Assimilation möglich, weil sozialstrukturelle Integration (Chancengleichheit) und kultureller Pluralismus nicht miteinander vereinbar seien (Unvereinbarkeitstheorem). Am Beispiel des klassischen Einwanderungslandes Kanada wird gezeigt, dass das Unvereinbarkeitstheorem eine unzulässige Verallgemeinerung darstellt und dass die interkulturelle Integration nach dem kanadischen Prinzip von Einheit-in-Verschiedenheit einen humanen Mittelweg zwischen Assimilation und Segregation darstellt. Dieses Konzept sucht nach einer ausgewogenen Balance zwischen den gesellschaftlichen Erfordernissen nach sozialer Kohäsion sowie den Interessen der Mehrheit am Respekt vor ihren Grundwerten einerseits und den Bedürfnissen der ethnischen Minderheiten nach Gewährung und Anerkennung sozialkultureller Differenzen andererseits. Am kanadischen Beispiel wird zugleich deutlich gemacht, dass es großer politischer und gesellschaftlicher Anstrengungen bedarf (ethnic diversity mainstreaming), um eine Ethnisierung der Ungleichheitsstruktur einzudämmen.