Toward a theoretical explanation of premature cabinet termination

Abstract. We propose a rational choice model of premature cabinet termination involving considerations of expected gain in terms of electoral payoffs, policy payoffs, or portfolio payoffs. This approach, which distinguishes contextual variables that will generally affect the nature of cost-benefit calculations made by political actors from the factors that are most likely to have a direct impact on a particular decision to precipitate a cabinet crisis, leads us to several testable hypotheses. We provide a first illustrative test of our predictions with data from the Netherlands.     

Getting away with foul play? The importance of formal and informal oversight institutions for electoral integrity

Electoral integrity is increasingly being recognised as an important component of democracy, yet scholars still have limited understanding of the circumstances under which elections are most likely to be free, fair and genuine. This article posits that effective oversight institutions play a key role in scrutinising the electoral process and holding those with an interest in the electoral outcome to account. The main insight is that deficiencies in formal electoral management can be effectively compensated for via one or more other institutional checks: an active and independent judiciary; an active and independent media; and/or an active and independent civil society. Flawed elections are most likely to take place when all four checks on electoral conduct fail in key ways. These hypotheses are tested and supported on a cross‐national time‐series dataset of 1,047 national‐level elections held in 156 electoral regimes between 1990 and 2012.     

POWER AND INTERACTIVE POLICY‐MAKING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POWER AND INFLUENCE IN 8 INTERACTIVE PROJECTS IN THE NETHERLANDS

A number of countries use forms of interactive policy‐making to increase the influence of citizens on decision making. Since there has also been an increase in citizen participation in The Netherlands over the last decade, in this paper, we provide a comparative analysis of 8 interactive projects initiated by the Dutch central government. The central aim of the paper is to understand processes of power in interactive policy‐making. We do so by raising two central questions: (1) how do power processes influence the setting‐up of a project, the negotiations within a project and the translation of the results of interactive projects into formal decision making circuits?; (2) to what extent and under what conditions do citizens and other stakeholders obtain influence in interactive projects, especially in defining problems, selecting solutions/instruments and realizing outcomes? Our findings show there is relatively little translation of the outcomes of the projects in regular decision making.     

REGULATORY RED TAPE AND PRIVATE FIRM PERFORMANCE

Regulation may obstruct dynamic adaptation, innovative power, and entrepreneurial activity. On the other hand, regulation could be interpreted as a phenomenon which society just has to learn to live with, and which otherwise does no real economic harm. This article explores both of these hypotheses. We study the impact of three dimensions of regulatory red tape on the performance of private companies: regulation cost, regulation change, and regulation inconsistency. We analyse unique survey data from 530 Dutch private companies. The results show that regulation cost, inconsistency, and change limit sales turnover growth, and that regulation change hampers market competition performance.