Putting the puzzle together: Why people join public interest groups

Why people join organizations, especially public interest groups, has been an unsolved puzzle. In this analysis, choice-based probability methods are employed to combine data from the 1980 National Election Study with comparable information about Common Cause members and to estimate models of the participation calculus that put the pieces of the puzzle together. The results demonstrate the primary importance of political interest and policy preferences for the membership choice. Citizens who are politically interested and have preferences that roughly match an organization's reputation find that associational membership has both greater benefits and lower costs for them than it does for others. Variations in the costs of communication — to the degree that they can be measured — are unimportant for the joining decision. An ability to pay is also irrelevant, regardless of educational attainment and despite members' high incomes. Organizational leaders deliberately keep the costs of membership low relative to most citizens' ability to pay; this encourages potential contributors to join in order to learn about the organization.I would like to thank Jeffrey Dubin for going beyond the realm of collegial obligation in providing programming and econometric assistance; Jeffrey Flint, for research assistance; and Kevin Grier, for wise advice. It should be emphasized, however, that all errors are exclusively the author's responsibility.     

The political policy cycle: Presidential effort vs. presidential control

After disentangling presidential budget proposals from budgetary changes attributable to fluctuations in the economy and to congressional action, we find consistent evidence for a presidential macroeconomic policy cycle attuned to the elctoral cycle. Proposed budgets are more expansionary in election years than at other times. The Congress, however, also plays a significant role in determining fiscal outcomes. Its budgets are systematically related to those of the President and in general reinforce presidential efforts to respond to the electoral cycle. Although Presidents generally propose quite conservative budgets, their proposals are more expansionary in presidential election years than in other years. The Congress, which generally adopts an expansionary fiscal policy ratifies this proposed macroeconomic policy electoral cycle by adopting even more expansionary budgets in presidential election years than they do at other times.     

The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes

President Reagan's tax reform proposals of May 1985 recommendedeliminating the deduction of state and local taxes in computingfederal taxable income. Arguments for and against deductibilityappeal to equity for taxpayers facing levies from multiple governmentsand to concern for the roles and responsibilities of governmentsin a federal system. Intense criticism and lobbying againstthe president's proposal was spearheaded by New York. The debatewas soon recast to emphasize the impact of change on other states,especially in the Northeast and Midwest, and the potential widespreadnegative effects on government services, especially education.The broadened base of opposition to change was sufficient tosustain deductibility in the bill passed by the House of Representativesin December 1985, illustrating that a cohesive lobbying effortinvoking the concept of federalism as a partnership can be fashionedby appealing to states on the basis of the negative consequencesof change.     

The Implementation of Welfare Reform Policy: The Role of Public Managers in Front-Line Practices

This study examines the extent to which staff in local welfare systems have embraced new welfare reform goals and, if so, the extent to which local management practices contribute to the alignment of staff priorities with policy objectives. It looks at agency structure and several aspects of public management from a microperspective that prior research has linked to agency performance including training, performance monitoring, staff resources, leadership characteristics, and personnel characteristics. The research indicates that front-line workers in welfare offices continue to believe that traditional eligibility determination concerns are the most important goals at their agencies. It also finds that management practices and the structuring of agency responsibilities matter: To the extent that public managers want to redirect local staff to focus their attention on the new goals associated with welfare reform, they can create the conditions under which staff have clear signals about what is expected and could provide them with the resources and incentives to realign their priorities.     

When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics

Recent years have witnessed many efforts to understand legislative productivity and gridlock. However, despite theoretical and empirical contributions to how preferences and institutions shape political gridlock's level (e.g., Krehbiel 1996, 1998 ) and empirical evidence about how parties may affect political gridlock (e.g., Binder 1999 ; Coleman 1999 ), we lack a comprehensive perspective theoretically and empirically examining preferences, institutions, and parties. We overcome this deficiency by modeling conditions for gridlock as a function of preferences and institutions—incorporating bicameralism and presidential influence—and of parties. By generating equilibrium gridlock intervals for empirical testing using Poole's (1998) common space scores, and showing that gridlock intervals associated with models in which parties have no effect or an agenda-setting role do not explain policy gridlock but that those linked to models with party-unity effects and strong presidential leadership do, we demonstrate the importance of accounting for party and leadership roles in explaining legislative choices.     

Defensive Enforcement: Human Rights in Indonesia

The objective of the article is to examine the human rights enforcement in Indonesian legal and political system. This is done by studying the legal basis of human rights, the process of proliferation of human rights discourse, and the actual controversies of human rights enforcement. The study has the effect of highlighting some of the immense deficits in ensuring that violations are treated under judicial procedure and the protection of human rights is available and accessible for victims. The author inevitably came into a conclusion that the openness of legal and political arenas for human rights discourses is not followed with a tangible impact on the entitlement positions of the people. The problems of the weak institutions and the unenthusiastic enforcement show that, in Indonesia, human rights are formally adopted as a political strategy to avoid substantial implementation.     

The Time to Give: PAC Motivations and Electoral Timing

There has been much discussion about how members of Congressdesire money early in the campaign season. However, theoreticalmodels of how contributions are allocated during the electoralcycle have been lacking. Our analysis attempts to remedy thisgap by providing and testing a model which specifies how theprocess of bargaining between members of Congress and organizedinterests produces the pattern of donations observed over thecourse of the electoral cycle. Most notably, our results suggestthat strategic incumbents can receive money early in the campaignif they desire but that they are generally unwilling to paythe price of lower aggregate fundraising and greater provisionof access. These findings buttress earlier empirical findingsthat question the instrumental value of early money. In addition,our results highlight that contribution choices are fundamentallyinfluenced by short-term factors, especially electoral conditions,that do not lend themselves to the routinized behavior necessaryfor contributors to invest in incumbents for long-run payoffs.     

A framework for analyzing organizational culture among politicians: Exploring implications for participatory governance schemes

In this article, we develop a theoretical framework for investigating how organizational culture relates to the roles of elected representatives. Based on Douglas's grid and group logic, our framework evaluates two cultural dimensions, negotiability and conflictuality, upon which these roles depend. The negotiability dimension describes elected representatives' roles from a strictly hierarchical and bounded notion of how politics should be handled to a horizontal and inclusive notion. The conflictuality dimension considers politics as confrontation versus a deliberative consensus-oriented way of handling political issues. By investigating a participatory governance measure called “task committees”, we examine how the framework functions empirically. Our analysis shows how different aspects of organizational culture are reflected in councilors' interpretations of and practices related to this interactive participatory governance scheme and illuminates the implications of organizational culture for the use of such schemes.